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AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY
WALTER F. PRATT, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past century, contract law, along with most of
American society, has undergone a "major transformation."'
While courts of a hundred or more years ago would have de-
clared an agreement not to be enforceable, courts today would
routinely consider the same agreement to be a contract. Under-
lying the transformation in contract law is a fundamental dis-
placement of one image of contract by another. The consequence
of that displacement is a greater involvement by courts in polic-
ing the performance of contracts.
The result of this transformation in contract law is docu-
mented and much discussed.' Little, however, has been written
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. Donald, Foreword to R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at vii
(1967); see also H. ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 457 (E. Samuels ed. 1974);
H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND at viii (1950) ("[T]he mid-[1880s] and the nineties
constituted something of a watershed in American history and thought and... the pe-
riod since that time has a certain unity."); id. at 41 ("The decade of the nineties is the
watershed of American history."); C. S. LEwIs, DE DESCRIPTIONE TEMPORUM (1955); H.
MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE at vii (1959); W. NUGENT, FROM CENTENNIAL TO
WORLD WAR: AMERICAN SOCmTY, 1876-1917, at xiv (1977); Bradbury & McFarlane, The
Name and Nature of Modernism, in MODERNISM: 1890-1930, at 49 (M. Bradbury & J.
McFarlane eds. 1978); Speziale, The Turn of the Twentieth Century as the Dawn of
Contract "Interpretation": Reflections in Theories of Impossibility, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 555
(1978-79).
2. The seminal work on the shift in doctrine is Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37); see also Konefsky,
Mensch & Schlegel, In Memoriam: The Intellectual Legacy of Lon Fuller, 30 BUFFALO L.
REV. 263 (1981). For more recent discussions, see, e.g., P. ATYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); J. DAwSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES (1980); C. FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROMISE (1981); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); M. HORWiTZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS So-
CIETY 20-21, 29 (1981) (movement described as one from contract to fiduciary); L MAC-
NEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
(1980); Fleming, The Sanctity of Contracts in Eclipse?, 24 AusTL. L.J. 306 (1950); Fried-
man, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 751,
777 (1965); Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract
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to account for the origins of the change. Those accounts that do
exist tend toward a generalized explanation that the change was
merely one part of a reaction against a style of reasoning known
as "formalism." 3 That conventional explanation has taken on an
almost legendary character according to which late-nineteenth-
century judges had settled into a style of reasoning deductively
from a priori rules. Not long thereafter, lore has it, judges of the
early twentieth century developed a preference for "scientific"
evidence that conclusions worked in practice. As with most leg-
ends, there is some truth to this account. But the truth is lim-
ited to a description of styles of reasoning. It does little to iden-
tify the sources of the reaction against formal rules; and it does
even less to explain why courts reached particular results. Spe-
cifically, the legend does not account for the courts' transforma-
tion of contract law.
Beyond the incomplete portrayal of the development of doc-
trine is a mischaracterization of the judges who participated in
the development. A stock figure in the legend is a late-nine-
teenth-century judge who is little more than a pertinacious ata-
vist, out of touch with the times, who sought only to obstruct
progress. However accurate that caricature might be in public
law, in private law it comes perilously close to exceeding the
proper bounds of literary license. The actual judges, atavistic
though they may have been, proved to be quite pliant in re-
sponding to the changes at the turn of the century. Moreover, in
their own way, the judges were remarkably in touch with the
spirit of the final years of the nineteenth century.
The thesis of this article is that the critical origins of the
transformation of contract doctrine lie in the period between
1870 and 1920. In that half century, roughly between the end of
Reconstruction and the end of the First World War, the United
States came to recognize itself as having changed from a tradi-
tional society, characterized by localism and face-to-face com-
munications, to a modern, -urban society, characterized by its
Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (1980); Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REv.
163 (1983).
3. See M. WHITE, SociAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA. THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM
(1949); see also M. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 253-66. For critical discussions of "formal-
ism," see Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREGmHTON L.
REV. 441 (1979); Comment, Instrumentalism v. Formalism: Dissolving the Dichotomy,
1978 WIs. L. REv. 997.
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cosmopolitan nature and by an economy which reached well be-
yond the village.4 Intangibly the society had changed from one
in which "[p]resent, past, and future [were] essentially the
same"5 to one in which change and uncertainty were dominant
and in which links to the past were weakening.6
The alterations in contract law matched those in society.
The judges of the Reconstruction period viewed contracts as
part of a market dominated by small, discrete transactions, as
the market had been in the past. But markets were changing,
reflecting the acceleration and fruition of many of the develop-
ments that had begun in the decades before the Civil War. In-
stead of being discrete and localized, transactions were now reg-
ularly more complex and regional as well as national. In an
effort to cope with the newer transactions in an unsettled econ-
omy, manufacturers developed new marketing techniques, most
often described in terms of vertical and horizontal integration.'
But the same factors that fueled the movement toward bigger
enterprises also produced new contracting practices, character-
4. See R. BROWN, MODERNIZATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE, 1600-
1865, at 9-13 (1976); W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at xvi; J. QUANDT, FROM THE SMALL TOWN
TO THE GREAT COMMUNITY: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF PROGRESSIvE INTELLECTUALS 3-5, 15
passim (1970); D. Russo, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: A NEW VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY
4 (1974). For a critique of "breakdown theories" of history, see T. BENDER, COMMUNITY
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (1978).
5. R. BROWN, supra note 4, at 9.
6. Id. at 12-13; cf. H. COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 407 ("In a general way it could
be said that the two generations after 1890 witnessed a transition from certainty to un-
certainty .... "); W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 30 ("[T]he decade of the 1870s was in
important respects the last of that older America that was so homogeneous in its rural-
centered culture, and the first of a newer kind of society whose thrust and whose
problems centered around cities, industry, different types of people, and unfamiliar
ideas."); R. WATSON, JR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POWER, 1900-1919, at 50-52
(1976) ("change was fundamental" influence of William James, Peirce, Dewey); R.
WIEBE, supra note 1, at 145 (fluidity of values); R. WILSON, IN QUEST OF COMMUNITY:
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1920, at 21 (1968) (period had a "singu-
lar air of constant change and uncertainty").
7. For a discussion of the iron industry's rapid growth from a regional to a na-
tional business, see G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS: STUDIES
IN THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF NINETEENTH CENTURY MARKETING 55-59 (1971).
8. See, e.g., S. BRUCHEY, GROWTH OF THE MODERN AMERICAN ECONOMY 102-03
(1975); G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, supra note 7, at 54-61; Chandler, The Coming of Big
Business, in THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO AMERICAN HISTORY 220, 225-29 (C. Vann
Woodward ed. 1968), reprinted in THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER: READINGS IN AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 268, 272-74 (A. Chandler, S. Bruchey, & L.
Galambos eds. 1968) [hereinafter THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER]; Chandler, The Be-
ginnings of "Big Business" in American Industry, 33 Bus. HIST. REV. 1 (1959).
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ized by reduced specificity in the terms of agreements. The pub-
lic debate about the ever larger corporate forms overshadowed
all other discussion of economic change.9 Thus eclipsed, the new
contract practices were usually discussed only within judicial
opinions. Nevertheless, those opinions reveal concerns about the
future of the country akin to the sentiments that dominated the
more public debate about large corporations.
Judges at first rejected these new practices by declaring the
agreements not to be enforceable as contracts. The new forms
failed to fit the existing image of contract; but they had become
too popular in the market for the courts long to resist. Recogniz-
ing that the doctrines of the past were no longer adequate for
the needs of a changing commercial world, the judges modified
the doctrines to embrace the greater uncertainty that character-
ized the new agreements. The judicial adaptations allowed the
enforcement of agreements that previously would not have been
enforced. But the change produced new difficulties for the
judges, who until then had faced only the binary decision of
whether or not to enforce an agreement. They now had to attend
to the performance of the contract and to the much more com-
plex questions arising from the uncertainties in the agreements
themselves. The judicial response to those new difficulties was
couched in terms familiar to the emerging communitarian theo-
ries of the era.10 In the language of the courts, the central con-
cept for both enforcement and performance came to be that of
"good faith."1 Through the use of that concept courts strove to
9. For discussions of the response of the law to this overshadowing debate, see,
e.g., G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965); G. MILLER, RAILROADS AND
THE GRANGER LAWS (1971); A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1910); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-
1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221 (1956); McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Struc-
ture of the Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIsT. 631 (1978).
10. Compare L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AM:ERICA. A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CASE STUDY 112-13 (1965) (early twentieth-century courts' "increased awareness of the
economic and social interdependence of the community") and id. at 156 with J. QUANDT,
supra note 4, at 27 ("applied to society, this theory posited increasing division of labor
and interdependance of parts") and R. WILSON, JR., supra note 6, at 30 ("urgent demand
for concepts of man that gave him protective membership in a social community that
stood as a buffer between the individual and the harsh uncertainties of both the evolu-
tionary and the industrial world").
11. A number of recent articles have discussed the current importance of the doc-
trine of good faith. See, e.g., Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Gillette, Limitations on the Obliga-
[Vol. 39
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preserve some of the moral decency of the rural past while al-
lowing the development of commercial practices for the urban
future, with as yet undefined morals. The result was an altered
image of contract, one in which the relationship between the
parties was closer to a fiducial one than to that of unrelated in-
dividuals in a free market."2
This article, then, looks to the emergence of the doctrine of
"good faith" as the key to understanding the major transforma-
tion in contract law during the past century. As is true with
most areas of private law, the path of this doctrinal development
is neither straight nor smooth. Rather, because it depends upon
the separate courts of many jurisdictions, the path is tortuous
and uneven. In an effort to smooth the path and to focus the
historical account, this article returns regularly to discussion of a
single case, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 3 which epito-
mizes the law's developing response to the uncertainty of the
late nineteenth century. What may seem, in the 1980s, to be an
easy decision was far from easy early in the century, as is appar-
ent from the divisions within the New York courts. Those divi-
sions, along with the facts of the case, make Wood an especially
useful lens through which to examine the changes in contract
law at the turn of the century. 14
tion of Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J. 619; Newman, The Renaissance of Good Faith in
Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORaNL L. REv. 553 (1969); Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 810 (1982); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
12. This combining of images is reminiscent of Thomas Bender's argument in
Community and Social Change in America. In his terms, the new image of contract was
one that sought to preserve some values of "gemeinschaft" within the "gesellschaft" of
the market economy. T. BENDER, supra note 4, at 13 and passim.
13. 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
14. I am not the first to see in Wood a significant change in the law. Karl Llewel-
lyn, for example, used it to illustrate "a whole new way of reading commercial docu-
ments." K. LLRWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 34 n.25 (1960). I
must also admit that the case makes the historical account much more fun. No other
case has links to so much that was symbolic of the modern America-ranging from the
Ziegfield Follies (for which Lucy designed costumes) to the Titanic, that tragically sinka-
ble manifestation of confidence in technology (Lucy and her husband survived the sink-
ing). Other links include the Kewpie doll (Wood was an advertising agent for the creator
of the doll, see infra note 64), the modem Olympic movement (Lucy's husband, Cosmo
Duff-Gordon was a fencer on the British Olympic team), Queen Victoria (Lucy designed
dresses for women attending her funeral, see infra note 57), and Sears, Roebuck's cata-
logue sales (Lucy agreed to design dresses to be sold by Sears, see infra notes 87-88). For
1988]
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I. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon-BACKGROUND
A. The Facts
The case began as a suit by Otis F. Wood against Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon for breach of an agreement signed in 1915.
According to Wood, the agreement gave him the exclusive right
to place Lucy's endorsements on products. Thus, when Lucy
herself placed endorsements, Wood contended that he should
have a share of the profits from those endorsements. Lucy de-
murred, arguing that for an agreement to be enforceable it must
impose obligations on both parties. This agreement was unen-
forceable, she contended, because it imposed no duties on Wood.
The trial judge overruled the demurrer; he interpreted the
agreement as requiring Wood to exercise his "bona fide-judg-
ment"-a requirement which the judge thought sufficient to give
content to Wood's obligation and thus to make the agreement
enforceable.15 The appellate division unanimously reversed, con-
cluding that the contract was "void for lack of mutuality."16 The
court found nothing in the agreement that required Wood to
place any endorsements. Viewed in that light, there was no obli-
gation in the agreement that could be enforced against Wood.
There was therefore no contract that Wood could enforce
against Lucy. The court of appeals, by a 4-3 vote, agreed with
the trial judge. Judge Cardozo's opinion for the majority used
the phrase "reasonable efforts" to describe Wood's obligation.1"
B. The Social Milieu
Although obviously important to the case, Wood and Car-
dozo were actually little more than supporting characters to the
role played by the defendant, Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, who was
one of the most vibrant symbols of the changing standards of
her era. Lucy herself described the change in fashion as one
a biography of Lucy and her sister, the novelist Elinor Glyn, see M. ETHERINGTON-SMITH
& J. PILCHER, THE "IT" GiRLS (1986).
15. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1917), reprinted in
Papers on Appeal at 13, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214
(1917).
16. 177 A.D. 624, 627, 164 N.Y.S. 576, 578 (1917).
17. 222 N.Y. at 92, 118 N.E. at 215. There was no dissenting opinion.
[Vol. 39
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away from individualism. In the years before the death of Queen
Victoria in 1901, according to Lucy, "every woman wanted to
look individual and unlike everyone else." But as the early years
of the twentieth century passed, women's fashion became "al-
most communal in its tendencies."'"
Lucy's description of changes in women's fashion was but a
cameo portrait of the changes in American society in the years
around the turn of the century. There was no overnight transfor-
mation into an industrial, urban economy; the changes had be-
gun decades before.' 9 In the years after the Civil War, however,
the rate and the nature of change so accelerated that it is accu-
rate to describe the economy of the late nineteenth century as
significantly different from the economy of mid-century. 20 Per-
haps more importantly, many in the United States began to per-
ceive21 the changes as moving significantly and finally away from
a nation which was primarily a collection of discrete, small com-
munities or neighborhoods.2 As the novelist Sherwood Anderson
18. L. DUFF-GORDON, DIsCRETIONS AND INDISCRETIONS 80 (1932); cf. F. KESSLER & G.
GILMORE, CONTRACTS 1118 (2d ed. 1970) ("In our own century we have witnessed what it
does not seem too fanciful to describe as a socialization of our theory of contract.").
Henry May described similar changes across much of American society between the end
of the nineteenth century and the end of the First World War. H. MAY, supra note 1. For
a study of May's thesis and additional autobiographical evidence of changes, see Bourke,
The Social Critics and the End of American Innocence: 1907-1912, 3 J. A7M. STUD. 57,
58-65 (1969).
19. S. BRUCHEY, supra note 8, at 29-32; S. BRUCHEY, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH, 1607-1861: AN ESSAY IN SOCIAL CAUSATION 91 (1965); C. NETTLES, THE
EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1775-1815 (1961); D. NORTH, THE ECONOMIC
GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1860 (1962).
20. S. BRUCHEY, supra note 8, at 83-84 (discussion of the "crucial differences be-
tween" the antebellum economy and that of the last decades of the century); G. PORTER
& H. LIvESAY, supra note 7, at 3 (causes of structural change in the marketing of goods
not "widely operative . . . until the closing decades of the nineteenth century"); THE
CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 8, at 2-3.
21. T. BENDER, supra note 4, at 109; cf. C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN
AMERICA 136 (1967) (increasing attention to urbanization in years after Civil War); Berle,
Preface to A. BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
at vii (1932) ("It is of the essence of revolutions of the more silent sort that they are
unrecognized until they are far advanced.").
22. T. BENDER, supra note 4, at 108-17. The nation was very much the Midwest, "a
farming section of separated villages whose isolation had hardened belief into certain
knowledge. The residents knew that Protestantism was the true religion, . . . and that
the farmers were the backbone of the country." L. ZIFF, THE AMCAN 1890s, at 74
(1966). On the Midwest, see R. JENSEN, THE WINNING OF THE MIDWEST. SOCIAL AND PO-
LITICAL CONFLICT, 1888-1896 (1971); P. KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE: A SOCIAL
ANALYSIS OF MIDWESTERN POLITICS, 1850-1900 (1970); see also H. COMMAGER, supra note
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wrote, before the change each town had
a character of its own, and the people who lived in the towns
were to each other like members of a great family .... [E]very
one knew his neighbor and was known to him. Strangers did
not come and go swiftly and mysteriously and there was no
constant and confusing roar of machinery and of new projects
afoot.23
The economy rested on those communities. The essence of pro-
duction remained the craft; most workers shared the opportu-
nity to put their hands on a product and to identify with it.24
Likewise, the basis for sales was personal knowledge and trust of
those with whom one dealt, even when the transaction extended
into a regional market.2 5 This personal involvement with pro-
duction and sales meant that buyers and sellers alike could
share the same values. In the words of the historian Henry F.
1, at 34 (rural basis for nineteenth century American values); A. TRACHTENBERG, THE
INCORPORATION OF AMERICA 20-22 (1982) (changing image of West from agrarian to
source of value for markets); G. WHITE, THE EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT AND THE WESTERN
EXPERIENCE 11 (1968); R. WIESE, supra note 1, at 12 ("American institutions were still
oriented toward a community life where family and church, education and press, profes-
sions and government, all largely found their meaning by the way they fit one with an-
other inside a town or a detached portion of a city.").
23. S. ANDERSON, POOR WHITE 46-47 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1926) (1st ed. 1920).
24. The story of the harnessmaker in Sherwood Anderson's novel Poor White pro-
vides an evocative portrayal of the effect of the loss of this ability. Id. at 53-54, 134-35,
208-11; see A. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 22, at 68-69, 149-50; see also I LIPPINCOTT,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 286, 462 (1921); W. NUGENT, supra note
1, at 34, 44. Nugent also relates that the "average number of workers per manufacturing
establishment was still only six people in 1880, which basically fits the picture of an
agrarian and small-firm economy." Id. at 34; cf. D. DUNCAN & C. PHILLIPS, RETAILING:
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 10 (1946). The loss of this connection between worker and
product became one of the laments of the Populists. See, e.g., W. Peffer, THE FARMER'S
SIDE: HIS TROUBLES AND THEIR REMEDY 51 (1891); J. QuANDT, supra note 4, at 88-89 (as
production and workers' tasks became more specialized, individuals found themselves
isolated from the community).
25. G. PORTER & H. LIvESAY, supra note 7, at 121 ("In a commercial world where
communications and banking facilities were primitive, reliance on a few trusted individu-
als became a fundamental element of the merchant's creed."). For a similar account of
the importance of personal trust in earlier years, see S. BRucHEY, THE ROOTS OF AMERI-
CAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 19, at 50; T. FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER. THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 8, 13 (1979); Madison, The Evolution
of Commercial Credit Reporting Agencies in Nineteenth Century America, 48 Bus.
HIST. REv. 164, 165-66 (1974); Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of
the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERI-
CAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 106-07 (R. Beeman, S. Botein, & E. Carter II eds. 1987).
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May, "The first and central article of faith in the national credo
was, as it always had been, the reality, certainty, and eternity of
moral values. '26 This implicit sharing of values extended
throughout American society, including even literature, whose
authors could assume a stable relationship between writer and
reader-a relationship that included "a community of attitudes,
a shared sense of reality. '27
The United States of 1870 was not yet ready to acknowledge
being an urban, industrial nation. According to the census, rural
places outnumbered urban places by a ratio of almost five to
one. 8The rural population was almost three times that of the
urban population. 29 Not until the census of 1920 would the ur-
ban population exceed the rural.30 Statistics for production and
income reflect similar characteristics for the nation. For exam-
ple, in the decade 1879-1888 the nonfarm component of gross
private domestic product exceeded the farm component for the
first time.3 ' Before then, no sector of the economy had equaled
the percentage of national income provided by agriculture. In
that decade, however, both manufacturing and trade exceeded
the agricultural income.2 Thereafter, manufacturing regularly
exceeded agriculture, though trade fell behind until the first dec-
ade after World War I."
Thus, by the first decades of the twentieth century, much
had changed. "[M]any people living in 1900 could remember
when neither railroads nor telegraphs nor telephones existed. In
a sense, such people were older than the American economy, a
phrase that had seldom been used at the time they were born
because it lacked content when economies were local and re-
26. H. MAY, supra note 1, at 9.
27. P. FAULKNER, MODERNISM 1 (1977); see also W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 11-12
(in spite of differences among Americans, "there did exist, in the [1870s] a degree of
unity in such areas as cultural assumptions, ethnicity, distribution of wealth, occupa-
tional experience, religious and moral outlook"); cf. H. MAY, supra note 1, at 6-8 (dinner
in 1912 for William Dean Howells celebrated "the unity, excellence, and continuity of
American nineteenth-century civilization").
28. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 11 (1975).
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 232.
32. Id. at 238.
33. Id.; see also S. LEE & P. PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY
272 (1979) (shift in economy in years after Civil War).
19881
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gional in nature. 3 4 Two symbols of this new American economy
were the city, with its discordant diversity, 5 and the railroad,
which provided an impersonal link, often over great distances,
between buyers and sellers.3
Although not all towns grew to be large cities, the rail lines
insured that few would remain isolated.17 The same lines that
34. S. RATNER, J. SOLTOW, & R. SYLLA, THE EvoLUTION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
320 (1979). As Professor Stuart Bruchey explained, it is during the period 1870-1900
"that we can first speak of the mass demand of a national urban market." S. BRUCHEY,
supra note 8, at 85; see also id. at 99-100 ("widening markets" characterize the era be-
tween 1870 and 1914). The first transcontinental railroad was not completed until 1869;
the telephone was invented in 1876. In 1850 there were not 10,000 miles of track in the
country; in 1870 there were just over 50,000 miles. By 1890, however, the total mileage
had more than tripled, to 167,000 miles. W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 5, 8, 33; cf. H.
COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 41 (contrasts between agricultural nation of years before
1890s and urban nation of years after that decade); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM
7 (1955) (similar dates for transition from agrarian society to modern urban life); id. at
23 ("The United States was born in the country and has moved to the city."); H. MAY,
supra note 1, at 95 ("In 1912, as everybody knew, village traditions were breaking down
as village isolation decreased. Village storekeepers were complaining that the mail-order
house, rural free delivery, and inter-urban trolleys were taking business to the towns.");
W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 5 (The 1870s were "a time with a visual, historical, and
social character which would soon be lost beneath the steaming accretion of future in-
dustrial-urban history."). See generally R. HOWER, HISTORY OF MACY'S OF NEW YORK
1858-1919, at 146 (1946). For a discussion of the development of a national culture, see
chapter 38 of LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY 639-51 (R. Spiller, W.
Thorp, T. Johnson, H. Canby, R. Ludwig, & W. Gibson eds. rev. 4th ed. 1974).
35. See generally H. COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 46; id. at 61 ("The city came to
dominate literature as it dominated economy and society."); G. BARTH, CITY PEOPLE 60-
61 (1980); B. TARKINGTON, THE TURMOIL 321 (1915) (contrast between "pioneer stock"
and city people). Michael Frisch has argued that the city came to be an impersonal ab-
straction to which its residents attached loyalty in place of the close associations of the
town. M. FRISCH, TOWN INTO CITY: SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS, AND THE MEANING OF
COMMUNITY, 1840-1880 (1972).
36. The great advances in transportation were a major factor in the growth of the
economy. Of similar importance, though not so visible and therefore not so productive of
concern, was the expansion of the industries that supplied raw materials. I. LIPPINCOTT,
supra note 24, at 277-78. Transportation, communication, and the availability of coal
were more directly related to the timing of increased output than was market demand. A.
CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 208
(1977); see R. GINGER, THE AGE OF ExCESs 45-46 (2d ed. 1975) (railroads aided growth of
large plants and expanded markets); cf. H. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 240 (generation be-
tween 1865 and 1895 "mortgaged to the railways").
37. J. QUANDT, supra note 4, at 52. Also consider the following explanation from
Professor Kirkland:
[The development of retail institutions in the period between the Civil War
and the First World War was the result of] strong economic forces pushing
marketing of merchandise into a new prominence and into new forms. On the
production side, these forces were epitomized by the larger quantity of com-
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brought new products also brought new ideas. The intellectual
challenge to existing values matched the economic challenge to
existing markets. Many, no doubt, would have agreed with the
philosopher James H. Tufts who observed that his "'generation
ha[d] seen the passing of systems of thought which had reigned
since Augustus.... Principles and standards which had stood
for nearly two thousand years [were being] questioned."' 38
The cities and the railroads could offer no consolation; they
only reinforced impressions of rapid change and of an increas-
ingly large number of value choices.39 In the words of one stu-
dent of the period, "a moral unity corresponding to [the] eco-
nomic web had not yet emerged. ' 40 As another author said,
"The abstract and translocal market increasingly challenged the
modities flowing from a dynamic industrialized economic order. The virtual
completion of a national transportation system, furthermore, enabled manufac-
turers and traders to break down autonomous and limited marketing areas and
to distribute products on a national scale. On the consumption side, growth of
trade reflected the increase in national income and its diffusion on such equali-
tarian terms that mass rather than elite markets emerged.
E. IRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE 264 (1961); see W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AhmE-
CAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 147 (1983).
38. Quoted in H. COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 106; see also S. ANDERSON, supra
note 23, at 64 (fathers who had discussed same values as of past; sons looked to new
values); Moore, Individualism in Architecture, 15 ARCHITECTURAL REc. 55, 55 (1904)
("We are living in a period of transition such as never before has occurred in the history
of mankind.").
39. H. COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 42-43, 48-53; P. FAULKNER, supra note 27, at 14
(discusses "complexity" of first decade of twentieth century); E. HAYTER, THE TROUBLED
FARMER, 1850-1900, at 9-10 (1968) (farmers confronted with challenges to beliefs by in-
dustrial capitalism; result was "a disquieting uncertainty"); R. HOFSTADTER, supra note
34, at 176 (1955) ("The whole cast of American thinking in this period was deeply af-
fected by the experience of the rural mind confronted with the phenomena of urban life,
its crowding, poverty, crime, corruption, impersonality, and ethnic chaos."); id. at 187
(those who migrated from rural to urban area moved from "a life based on primary
human contacts-the family, the church, the neighborhood" to "a more impersonal envi-
ronment, in which they experienced a much larger number of more superficial human
relationships."); W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 66 (during the 1870s changes began which
rendered "the old value system obsolete"); G. WHITE, supra note 22, at 19; R. WILSON,
supra note 6, at 89 (biography of sociologist Edward Ross mirrors obsolescence of rural
values for urban America). For a poignant recreation of the effect of the changes in phys-
ics on a traditional mind, see R. MCCORMMACH, NIGHT THOUGHTS OF A CLASSICAL PHYSI-
cisT (1982). Cf. LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, supra note 34, at 729
(American humor began to concentrate on "the progressive industrialization and urban-
ization of our society, and the increasing complexities of modem living"); id. at 790
(change in attitudes from those based on an "uncentralized agrarian social pattern" to
those "relevant to an integrated society dominated by huge metropolitan centers").
40. J. QUANDT, supra note 4, at 17.
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family and community as a foundation for social order.""1 To
replace the values of the community, the best that the city and
the railroad could offer were the values of commerce.42 The re-
sult was, in the hyperbole of Henry James, that the United
States became "the only great people that is exclusively com-
mercial."4 3 Possibly the most abrupt statement of those values
came from the Wizard of Oz, who rejected Dorothy's plea that
he must help her because he was strong and she was weak. Re-
sponding to Dorothy's plea for justice, Oz said, "In this country
everyone must pay for everything he gets. . . .Help me and I
will help you."44
The new values, unlike the old, could not readily be shared;
indeed, because they would exact payment for every exchange,
they were the antithesis of sharing. More often than not, they
contravened the values of the community, or they were so dispa-
rate as to be incoherent.4" One could therefore sympathize with
the reaction of a character in a novel portraying rural life in
New England who complained about recent intrusions by stran-
gers coming into her village: "I see so many of these new folks
nowadays, that seem to have neither past nor future. Conversa-
tion's got to have some root in the past, or else you've got to
explain every remark you make, an' it wears a person out."4
41. T. BENDER, supra note 4, at 113.
42. L. ZIFF, supra note 22, at 348; cf. W. CHURCHILL, MR. CREW'S CAREER 53 (1908)
(new values marked "the springing of a generation of ideals from a generation of com-
merce"); H. COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 56-57 (discussion of developing criticism of com-
mercial values); id. at 247-76 (discussion of "literature of revolt"). For a novel which
deals with the inability of new values to replace the old ones, see H. FREDERIC, THE
DAMNATION OF THERON WARE (John Harvard Library ed. 1960) (1st ed. 1896). The book
is discussed in L. ZIFF, supra note 22, at 214-17.
43. James, Americans Abroad, 27 THE NATION 208 (1878). See generally W. How-
ELLS, A TRAVELER FROM ALTRURIA (1st ed. 1894), reprinted in THE ALTRURIAN ROMANCES
(C. Kirk & R. Kirk eds. 1968) (note especially pages 115-20, 122-23; lamenting the de-
cline of farm life); B. TARKINGTON, supra note 35, at 211.
44. L. BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ (1st ed. 1900), reprinted in M. HEARN,
THE ANNOTATED WIZARD OF Oz 208 (1973).
45. R. WIEBE, supra note 1, at 42-43 ("As the network of relations affecting men's
lives each year became more tangled and more distended, Americans in a basic sense no
longer knew who or where they were. The setting had altered beyond their power to
understand it, and within an alien context they had lost themselves.").
46. S. JEwETT, THE COUNTRY OF THE POINTED FiRs 97 (1896); see also G. BARTH,
supra note 35, at 4 (people in cities had to develop new responses to the problems of
urban life "and these accommodations created new patterns of getting along with each
other").
[Vol. 39
1988] AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW
One could just as readily have said "trade" or "bargaining" in-
stead of "conversation."
The reaction to and against the new commercial values was
but part of the increasingly prominent belief that the end of the
nineteenth century marked a turning point in human history,
much like Lucy's designs marked the end of the Victorian era in
fashion. The belief found expression in the popular phrase "fin-
de-siecle," which literally means "end of the century."'47 To
many Americans of the late nineteenth century, however, the ex-
pression meant more than the announcement of a change in the
calendar. They thought that with the end of the century came
an end to the relevance of history.48 In art and literature, for
example, that belief found voice through arguments for new
"forms" of expression; the old forms were considered inadequate
for the new conditions of the twentieth century.4 9
This turmoil, both physical and intellectual, had a profound
impact upon the law, possibly the aspect of culture that most
47. See H. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 331; P. FAULKNER, supra note 27, at 5-6, 14-15;
F. KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING 96-97 (1967); M. NORDAU, DEGENERATION (1895);
L. ZIFF, supra note 22, at 133, 136, 214-15; see also W. HoWELLS, supra note 43, at 121
(country in a transition period when the "struggle for life has changed from a free fight
to an encounter of disciplined forces, and the free fighters that are left get ground to
pieces between organized labor and organized capital"); Flower, Some of Civilization's
Silent Currents, 6 THE ARENA 765, 765 (1892) ("The present is so pre-eminently a transi-
tion period, a day of such striking contrasts and startling antitheses, that it is difficult"
for anyone to perceive the true status of civilization).
48. See G. BARTH, supra note 35, at 3 ("The widening gap between past and pre-
sent. . . ."); H. COMMAGER, supra note 1, at 58 (the younger literary figures of 1890-1905
were "rebels" who "had no past"; the older figures "were indifferent to the future"); P.
FAULKNER, supra note 27, at 1 ("Modernism is part of the historical process by which the
arts have dissociated themselves from nineteenth-century assumptions, which had come
in the course of time to seem like dead conventions."); H. MAY, supra note 1, at 31; P.
SPRAGUE, GUIDE TO FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT AND PRAIRIE SCHOOL ARCHITECTURE IN OAK
PARK 7 (1976); L. ZIF, supra note 22, at 102 (quoting Hamlin Garland on impact of
evolution); Bradbury & McFarlane, supra note 1, at 22.
49. As early as 1863 the brilliant Charles Peirce had asserted that the age was at an
end and called "for a new kind of culture whose fundamental sentiments and faiths
would be not merely different from but opposed to the faiths and sentiments of the
Age." R. Wu.SON, supra note 6, at 33; see E. Ross, SIN AND SocIETY (1907) (argues that
new conditions of life demand a new code of morality) (Hofstadter describes Sin and
Society as "a very popular book." R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 34, at 203 n. 8); cf. H.
ADAhtS, supra note 1, at 26, 53; H. MAY, supra note 1, at 7 (after 1917 the one-time dean
of American letters, William Dean Howells, became a symbol of "a rejected past"); B.
TARKINGTON, supra note 35, at 321 (relics of the "old period" could still be found occa-
sionally in cities); Carter, Introduction to H. FREDERIC, supra note 42, at vii; Moore,
supra note 38, at 68.
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prides itself in being influenced by the past, by precedent. De-
spite that pride, as Cardozo would later write, "[t]he great tides
and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in
their course, and pass the judges by."50 The value choices inher-
ent in the spreading tracks of economic transactions and the
multifarious bustle of the city threatened to overwhelm citizens
and judges alike. But lawyers and judges lacked the freedom of
artists to declare openly their break with precedent or their dis-
association with the forms of the past. 1 Nevertheless, the law
underwent a change similar to that in the arts and the rest of
American society.
In no area of law was this turbulence of more significance
than in contract law, the area of law that arose to establish set-
tled rules to facilitate planning for the future.52 The turmoil of
the late nineteenth century threatened to put an end to any
hope for stability. Contracting, like conversation, had in earlier
times been rooted in the past. People who knew one another and
who knew the local market, insulated as it was from dramatic
shifts in the economy, faced little likelihood of changes in cir-
cumstances that would require elaborate agreements or provoke
complex disputes.5 3 Railroads and cities, however, seemed to dis-
rupt that past by bringing economic uncertainty into the local
markets. Parties thus faced the tiring prospect of writing detail
upon detail into each agreement if they were to account for
50. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921), reprinted in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 178 (M. Hall ed. 1967).
51. Cf. White, Scholarly Books: What, to Whom and Why, 81 MICH. L. REV. 723
(1983):
In contrast to medicine and many other endeavors, the law neither welcomes
nor graciously accepts change. Rather, in the interest of preserving certainty in
the regulation of men's affairs, the law resists all appearance of change. Thus
courts often disguise their modifications of judicial doctrines and sometimes
even go so far as to deny that any change has occurred.
Id. at 724; Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365, 369 (1921) (reasons for
slow change in law); see also IV. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 37-65 (argues that American
"ideas and institutions" reacted conservatively to the economic crises of the late nine-
teenth century). Professor Morton Horwitz has argued that the same description should
be applied to legal historians. See Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing
of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 275 (1973).
52. See M. HORWITz, supra note 2, at 173-74.
53. See Haskins, Planter and Cotton Factor in the Old South: Some Areas of Fric-
tion, 29 AGHic. HisT. 1, 10 (1955), reprinted in THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER, supra




As was true of other areas of society, contract law adapted
to the changing circumstances. The contours of the developing
new consensus were apparent in the 1917 opinion of the New
York Court of Appeals in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon. Al-
though the forms often remained the same, the content under-
went substantial change. Much like poets who would argue
whether free verse retained the form of poetry, so legal scholars
would later argue whether the changes which emerged in con-
tract law at the turn of the century retained the form of
contract. 4
III. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon-THE ECONOMY
A. The Contract Between Lucy and Wood
As she did with the general development of the period, Lucy
personified the particular changes in the economy and in con-
tract practice. Very much independent, Lucy renounced the tra-
ditions of her generation when she began her own business, de-
signing women's clothing.5 Like many of the entrepreneurs of
the period, Lucy started with little capital.56 Nevertheless, after
overcoming early difficulties, she established herself by 1900 as
one of the pre-eminent designers of fashion for women. In a
manner typical of the personal style of the American economy
during the Reconstruction era, Lucy at first designed only for
individual women for specific grand occasions such as corona-
tions and state funerals.57 Because her designs were created for
one woman to wear on a particular occasion, they became known
as "personality" dresses."'
As the times changed, so did Lucy. First, she became a com-
54. This is in essence the dispute sparked by Professor Gilmore's lectures pub-
lished under the title The Death of Contract, supra note 2.
55. L. DUFF-GORDON, supra note 18, at 59.
56. Id. at 54-56.
57. Id. at 46. Possibly the most spectacular of Lucy's accomplishments was design-
ing different mourning dresses for one hundred women in Queen Victoria's funeral and
then promptly producing different designs for two hundred women for the coronation of
King Edward VII. See SAT. EVENING POST, Jan. 29, 1927, at 12, 13, 91; The Times
(London), Apr. 23, 1935, at 12, col. 3.
58. L. DUFF-GORDON, supra note 18, at 38.
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pany, with the name "Lucile."59 Later, in 1910, she opened a
branch office in New York City where she continued to embody
the economic changes by depersonalizing her services. In com-
mon with much of the production in the United States, Lucy no
longer personally designed each dress for each customer. In-
stead, she hired others to design and sew; she even began to pro-
duce more than one dress of each design. With the change in
style and the concentration of population in urban areas, Lucy
could now profit from marketing multiple copies of the same de-
sign. In addition, Lucy hired a manager for her branch office,
further increasing the distance between herself and her custom-
ers; she would no longer be able to devote personal attention to
each client for each occasion.
Lucy also came to appreciate that something as ephemeral
as her name could be of value in the emerging consumer society
of the United States.60 As seller after seller saw production over-
take demand in the last years of the nineteenth century,"1 adver-
59. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1935, at 17, col. 1; cf. A. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 22, at
82 (on the increasing number of incorporations). Lucy's company had a short-lived finan-
cial success and went bankrupt in 1922. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1922, at 10, col. 3. In 1924
her London firm failed. The Times (London), Apr. 19, 1923, at 5, col. a. During the
proceedings following that bankruptcy, the Recorder of Bankruptcy asked her whether
she could tell him about her shareholders. Lucy responded, "It's all Greek to me. I don't
know what a share is." N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1935, at 17, col. 1. Lucy's admission showed
how much she remained a creature of the nineteenth century, much like the harness-
maker of Sherwood Anderson who, when told how he might make more profit, re-
sponded, "Business ... what do I know about business? I'm a harnessmaker, I am." S.
ANDERSON, supra note 23, at 208.
60. See D. POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING (1983); T. VEBLEN, THE
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). The consumer came to replace the producer as the
perceived fundamental entity in the economy. W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 135-37.
61. Truman E. Moore well captured the spirit of the years at the end of the nine-
teenth century when he wrote that there was
a madness that seemed to have seized men who ran the factories. If so many
products could be produced, then so many products should be produced, and
therefore would have to be sold. The study of commercial history leaves one
with the impression that great factories grew not because they were needed,
but because they were possible.
T. MOORE, THE TRAVELING MAN: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN TRAVELING SALESMIAN 66
(1972). Moore also noted that the problem of overproduction was primarily one of con-
sumer goods; the distribution of capital goods did not become a problem until the De-
pression. Id. at 81-82, 105; see also A. CHANDLER, supra note 36, at 208 (market demand
was only partly responsible for increased production; the improvements in transporta-
tion, communication, and the production of raw materials were major causes); R. GINGER,
supra note 36, at 36, 55 (the frontier encouraged increased mechanization; industrial
capacity in general increased); R. HOWER, THE HISTORY OF AN ADVERTISING AGENCY 7
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tising became increasingly important both to inform buyers of
products and to persuade customers to buy.62 To take advantage
of that new demand, Lucy turned to an advertising agent, yet
another intermediary between herself and her clients.6
The agreement with the agent provided that because Wood
"possesse[d] a business organization adapted to the placing of
such endorsements as the said Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, has ap-
proved," Lucy agreed to grant Wood "the exclusive right to
place such endorsements on such terms and conditions as may
in his judgment, and also in the judgment of said Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, or A. Merritt, her personal business adviser, be
most advantageous" to Lucy and Wood. 4 The agreement was to
last for a year and to renew itself automatically unless either
party gave ninety days notice of termination.
One aspect of the agreement with Wood is especially impor-
tant because it represents the most significant change in con-
tract practice and, consequently, the critical challenge to con-
tract doctrine at the turn of the century: The agreement did not
(rev. ed. 1949); J. HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 43 (1982) ("From
the 1880s on, but especially in the twentieth century, headlong developments in the tech-
nology of production and distribution and in entrepreneurial and managerial skill have
generated outputs on a scale which only markets of sectional and national scope could
accommodate."); S. LEE & P. PASSELL, supra note 33, at 269; S. RATNER, J. SoLTow, & R.
SYLLA, supra note 34, at 286-87 (investment in capital goods not easily transferred; so
manufacturers tended to continue production even though not profitable in hope that
others would go out of business first); D. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 27-28 (2d ed. 1978) ("By the 1880s many businessmen had begun
to worry that there were too many factories for the economy to absorb.").
62. L. ATHERTON, MAIN STREET ON THE MIDDLE BORDER 222-24 (1954); R. HOWER,
supra note 61, at 9, 116; see also T. MOORE, supra note 61, at 82; G. PORTER & H. LIVE-
SAY, supra note 7, at 224-25 (statement by soap manufacturer about change toward
brand names).
63. See R. GINGER, supra note 36, at 49-50; cf. G. BARTH, supra note 35, at 78
("advertising agent was another variety of intermediary in economic affairs"); MANAGE-
RIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISE 1 (A. Chandler & H. Daems eds. 1980); R. WEBE, supra note 1, at 19-21
(change from marketing directly under control of a single person to agents in the field).
64. Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, included in Papers on Appeal at 5, Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). The nature of Wood's busi-
ness organization is not clear. His obituary in the New York Times reported that he had
been a journalist, not an advertising agent. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1939, at 23, col. 4. Even
so, in the years before advertising agents were common, it may have been his ability to
write that attracted Lucy to him. See R. HOWER, supra note 61, at 95. Whatever his
talents, Wood was at least willing to sue to enforce what he saw as his rights under
agreements similar to that with Lucy. See Papers on Appeal, Wood v. Wilson (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1916) (suit against the creator of the Kewpie doll).
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fully define Wood's obligation; he was to do whatever his judg-
ment directed, with the consent of Lucy's manager. In the field
of advertising it was known as an "open contract." 5 The agree-
ment also contained a second type of contract provision devel-
oped in response to the economic uncertainty of the late nine-
teenth century-Wood's right was exclusive." Both aspects of
the agreement were consequences of Lucy's and Wood's inability
to know in advance what opportunities might exist for placing
her endorsements. Like other producers who sought to develop
new markets, Lucy benefited from the agreement by being freed
from having to make decisions about advertising. She could con-
centrate on her special skill, designing, while Wood concentrated
on his presumptive specialty, advertising. From Wood's perspec-
tive the agreement was beneficial because it assured him that he
would have no competition in his efforts to place Lucy's en-
dorsements. Thus, there would be one less uncertainty in the
undeveloped market for her designs.
B. The Economic Milieu
Prior to the Civil War, there had been little need to resort
to contract to deal with uncertainty. The localized transactions
in standardized goods for a primarily agrarian market had insu-
lated commerce from most swings of the economy.67 What litiga-
tion there was in the antebellum years tended to deal with the
system of money itself and not with attempts by the parties to
65. See R. HOWER, supra note 61, at 71-72; id. at 239 (the "advertiser was to place
through N.W. Ayer & Son all the newspaper advertising that he required during a year
or more; in return for this promise Ayer pledged the best resources of his firm in the
selection of media and purchase of space"); id. at 243 (sample of contract for 1891);
Carlton Illustrators v. American Locomotive Co., 168 A.D. 289, 153 N.Y.S. 1018 (1915)
(contract to supply all the illustrations "required" for advertisements).
66. For discussion and examples of contracts for exclusive dealings, see L. ASHER &
E. HEAL, SEND No MONEY 61 (1942); L. ATHERTON, supra note 62, at 224-25 (by the mid-
1880s exclusive agencies were quite common for style or for durable goods, especially
when manufacturers wanted to "invade[ ] new territory"); T. BECKMMN, WHOLESALING
147-153 (1926) (including tacit understanding that exclusive agency included exclusive
source of supply); R. HOWER, supra note 34, at 164 (brand name gloves to be sold exclu-
sively at Macy's); G. LEBHAR, CHAIN STORES IN AMERICA, 1859-1950, at 103 (1952); R.
TWYNIAN, HISTORY OF MARSHALL FIELD & Co., 1852-1906, at 97-98 (1954); see also Fowle
v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889) (upholds contract for exclusive geographical sales area for
Wistar's Balsam of Wild Cherry).
67. G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, supra note 7, at 9; Chandler, supra note 8, at 4.
[Vol. 39
19881 AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 433
deal with uncertainty in the market.68 That was true partially
because a stable monetary system is basic to any economy which
is to advance beyond bartering in a localized market.6 9 In part,
though, it was true because few national markets existed before
the Civil War and the small scale of transactions required less
planning to avoid uncertainty.0
After the war, however, a relatively stable system of money
aided the emerging national market for an ever greater variety
of products. 71 The development of new markets for new prod-
ucts and increased output required additional planning because
uncertainties increased as transactions extended over both
longer times and greater distances. New markets also meant
more contact with strangers." To complicate matters further, a
68. Uncertainty about the monetary system is possibly the most basic type of eco-
nomic uncertainty. If the parties could not be certain that a particular medium of ex-
change would be in effect at the time for performance and payment, then they had to
choose a satisfactory replacement. The creation of a national legal tender by 1871 meant
that the parties to a contract were no longer subject to serious uncertainty about the
continuance of a particular medium of exchange. The first act creating a legal tender was
the Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345. Congress subsequently authorized addi-
tional issues of legal tender. See Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532; Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 73, 12 Stat. 709. The Supreme Court first held the acts to be unconstitutional,
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), then reversed itself and held the acts
to be constitutional, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). For a discussion
of those cases, see Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 367.
69. See J. HURST, supra note 61, at 40-42, 57. For an account of the financing prac-
tices of merchants see G. PORTER & H. LIvESAY, supra note 7, at 16, 62-78; id. at 109
(example of barter by manufacturer of railroad wheels faced with increasing costs).
70. See R. BROWN, supra note 4, at 117-18, 122; E. DOUGLASS, THE COMING OF AGE
OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 290-91 (1971) (combination and integration the dominant post-
war trends in response to national market); S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM
1885-1914, at 188-93 (1957); S. RATNER, J. SoLTow, & R. SYLLA, supra note 34, at 123,
183-84, 224, 235; see also THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 8, at 2-3 ("small-
scale production for local or regional markets" was "fundamental characteristic" of the
market prior to Civil War); id. at 13, 17.
71. On the greater availability of cash, both from retained earnings and from a
newly developed national capital market, see G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, supra note 7, at
116. On national and urban markets, see A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE CHAP-
TERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 23 (1962); R. GINGER, supra note 36,
at 22 (crucial developments between 1877 and 1893); R. WATSON, JR., supra note 6, at 4
("development of the country as a huge, free trade area"). On the growth of non-stan-
dard products, see G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, supra note 7.
72. Lippincott points to those reasons for the development of corporations: "Rail-
ways had opened vast markets for merchants and manufacturers; enterprises were grow-
ing in size and much larger amounts of capital were required. At the same time the risks
of enterprise were much greater. Producers were selling to large numbers of consumers
they did not know and had never seen." I. LIPPINCOTT, supra note 24, at 471; Madison,
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steady decline of prices and almost periodic panics, or depres-
sions, unsettled the country in the last decades of the nineteenth
century.73 To compensate for the new problems and to reduce
uncertainty, parties turned to new forms of contractual arrange-
ments with increasing frequency. 74
The agreement between Wood and Lucy typified the re-
sponses to uncertainty about markets. Like Lucy and Wood,
many parties were unable to define the future with precision.
They therefore preferred to leave parts of any agreement "open"
to await future developments.75 The techniques of production
supra note 25, at 164, 166.
73. There were panics in 1873, 1878, and 1893. See R. FELS, AMERICAN BusiNEss
CYCLES, 1865-1897 (1959); S. REZNECK, BusiNEss DEPRESSIONS AND FINANCIAL PANICS
(1968).
74. Cf. THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 8, at 206 (In the 1860s "rail-
road men and manufacturers were still searching for a legal and administrative structure
that would give them some control over the uncertainties created by a rapidly industrial-
izing economy").
75. The output and requirements contracts discussed in the text had little history
before the Civil War. Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL.
L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1932) ("The only case found in this country prior to the middle of the
nineteenth century involving a contract of the type considered in this article without a
fixed quantity term is Mason v. Cowan's Administrator [40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 7 (1840)]."
The contract, dated November 1836, provided that the buyer would purchase all the
hogs the seller "may have for market, next fall." The agreement stated that there would
be "about one hundred" hogs. When the seller was unable to produce the estimated hogs
he purchased hogs from another person and tendered them to the buyer, who refused to
take them. The court held that the buyer was within his rights since the contract envi-
sioned that the hogs would come from the particular seller. There was no discussion of
the "output" aspect of the contract.) At least one other case, however, involved a similar
contract. See Cherry v. Smith, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 19 (1842) (enforcing agreement to ship
up to 150 barrels of salt "when called on"). For another early discussion of requirements
contracts, see Note, The Construction of Requirement Contracts and the Effect of Esti-
mate Provisions Therein, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 223 (1928). A more recent examination of
similar issues is found in Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089 (1981).
Obviously the use of reported judicial decisions is an imperfect basis for a history of
economic practice. It is possible that the contracts were used earlier but did not provoke
litigation. The general absence of reference to these contracts in the literature of eco-
nomic history suggests that the possibility is slight. The secondary sources, however, may
themselves be inadequate-the economic historians may have been exclusively concerned
about marketing practices rather than about the contracts that underlay the practices.
Nevertheless, the appearance of the cases in the 1870s does suggest that a change oc-
curred. If the contracts were used previously, the lack of dispute about them reinforces
the argument for a community of values and a stability of economy in those earlier years.
The appearance of disputes, therefore, is but one more reflection of the changes occur-
ring in the period. Moreover, this article is an account of the changes in legal doc-
trine-changes that could occur only after the contracts became the subject of dispute.
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that emerged during the years of rapid economic expansion after
the Civil War left the new industries with uncertainties about
their productive capacity."6 Those industries, therefore, pre-
ferred buyers who were willing to leave the quantity term open,
agreeing to buy whatever the industry could produce.7 7 The re-
sulting agreement came to be known as an "output" contract.
Similarly, a buyer who was uncertain about the supply of goods
or of the market for the finished product might want a seller to
agree to sell only what the buyer would order-a "requirements"
contract.71 Requirements contracts were especially useful when
new markets were opened through advertising or traveling sales-
men. 9 The requirements contract permitted an agent or retail
outlet to order only the quantity it could actually sell.80 A com-
76. See supra note 61.
77. In some instances the new means of production required a certain source of raw
materials to ensure that the production would be profitable. One instance involved a new
cannery; for the cannery to be profitable, there had to be a guaranteed source of supply
for the vegetables. The court explained that a contract under which a farmer promised to
deliver his crop of corn was to the mutual benefit of both parties. The cannery gained
assurance of its supply; the farmer gained assurance of a market. As the court explained,
there was evidence that
corn fit for this purpose [canning] could not be obtained in the open market in
sufficient quantities to authorize the necessary expense in building, machinery
and preparations required to carry on this business, but that to make it a pru-
dent and safe business resort must be had to contracts like the one under
consideration.
J. Winslow Jones & Co. v. Binford, 74 Me. 439, 444 (1883); cf. Fontaine v. Baxley, Boles
& Co., 90 Ga. 416, 426, 17 S.E. 1015, 1018 (1892) (requirements contract for railroad ties
beneficial to both parties); Garden City Sand Co. v. Southern Fire Brick & Clay Co., 124
Ill. App. 599, 606 (output contract provided "sure and steady market"), aff'd, 223 Ill.
616, 79 N.E. 313 (1906).
78. See, e.g., Rozier v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 147 Mo. App. 290, 126 S.W. 532
(1910) (quarry owner did not want to open new quarry unless certain of market for
output).
79. E.g., A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 F. 719, 720, 722-23, 725 (8th
Cir. 1907) ("Optimo" cigars); National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427,
431 (1884) (pig iron); Spencer v. Taylor, 69 Kan. 493, 496-97, 77 P. 276, 277 (1904) (min-
eral waters); Scott v. T.W. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N.W. 316 (1915) (clothing).
For a discussion of the efforts of local, traditional businessmen to secure statutory re-
strictions on traveling salesmen, see Hollander, Nineteenth Century Anti-Drummer Leg-
islation in the United States, 38 Bus. HIsT. REv. 479 (1964). For a case study of the
efforts of the Singer Sewing Machine Company to resort to the courts to protect its
salesmen from local restrictions, see McCurdy, supra note 9, at 631, 637-42.
80. Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. F.G. Walker Co., 156 Ky. 6, 160 S.W. 777 (1913) (whisky);
Cullinan v. Standard Light & Power Co., 65 S.W. 689, 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (oil); S.
RATNER, J. SoLTow, & R. SYLLA, supra note 34, at 375-78 (developments of wholesalers,
etc.); cf. Havighurst & Berman, supra note 75, at 1 (uncertainties led to new types of
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mon addition to both the output contract and the requirements
contract was a provision allowing one party to have an exclusive
right to deal with the other, just as Wood and Lucy ostensibly
had done."1 Buyers would agree to sell only the products of par-
ticular sellers; or sellers would agree to sell only to particular
buyers, usually in a defined geographical area. That type of con-
tract was especially attractive for sellers like Lucy who sought to
introduce products into new markets.8 2
One other version of the output contract, and another sig-
nificant response to uncertainty in the late nineteenth century,
arose in the context of developing a specialized market which
traded in uncertainty itself and through which risks could be
contracts). The court in Bloomington Canning Co. v. Union Can Co., 94 Ill. App. 62, 66
(1901), explained that a requirements contract benefited both parties. The buyer was
able to secure a source for his needs without having to fix the quantity; the seller was
able to estimate his needs for raw materials. See also Golden Cycle Mining Co. v. Rapson
Coal Mining Co., 188 F. 179 (8th Cir. 1911) (new ore industries works needed continuous
supply of coal in 1906); Connersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123,
127, 76 N.E. 294, 295 (1905) (McFarlan could sell as many carriages as it could manufac-
ture; it needed a certain supply of wheels, yet all wheel manufacturers were operating at
full capacity).
81. The following is but a partial list of the many cases involving an exclusive right
to sell particular products: Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 138 Ark. 534, 212 S.W.
313 (1919) (motor trucks and parts); Lowery Lock Co. v. Wright, 154 Ga. 867, 115 S.E.
801 (1922) (transmission lock for Ford cars); Phares v. Stover, 136 Ga. 843, 72 S.E. 344
(1911) (miscellaneous parts); Carterville Coal Co. v. Covey-Durham Coal Co., 186 Ill.
App. 163 (1914) (coal); Olson v. Whiffen, 175 Ill. App. 182 (1912) (bottles and bottling
equipment); Bendix v. Stayer Carriage Co., 174 III. App. 589 (1912) (Stayer automobiles);
Kaufman Bros. & Co. v. Farley Mfg. Co., 78 Iowa 679, 43 N.W. 612 (1889) (cigars); Elk-
horn Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Eaton, Rhodes & Co., 163 Ky. 306, 312, 173 S.W. 798,
800 (1915) (coke); Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319
(1891) (mineral water); Lewis v. Atlas Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61 Mo. 534 (1876) (insurance);
Paragon Distrib. Corp. v. Paragon Laboratories, Inc., 99 N.J. Eq. 224, 129 A. 404 (1925)
(hair dye); Hadden v. Dimick, 31 How. Pr. 196 (N.Y. 1866) (blankets); Ash v. Charles F.
Noble Oil & Gas Co., 96 Okla. 211, 223 P. 175 (1923) (petroleum products); Leisy Brew-
ing Co. v. Schafer, 91 Okla. 105, 216 P. 109 (1923) (product of brewery); Mowbray Pear-
son Co. v. E.H. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 187 P. 370 (1920) (ice).
82. Both exclusive dealing contracts and the more familiar vertical integration were
common practices of new industries as well as of other industries faced with marketing
difficulties. See G. PORTER & H. LIvEsAY, supra note 7, at 132. A producer that integrated
forward gained control of the retail or wholesale outlet for its products. The same pro-
ducer had only slightly less control over an independent outlet that was, on the one
hand, obligated to buy its requirements from the producer, and, on the other hand, privi-
leged to be the exclusive dealer for the product. For discussions that link output and
requirements contracts with vertical integration, see, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Con-
tract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE. L.J. 704, 727 (1931); Kessler & Stern, Compe-
tition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959).
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shared among a larger number of individuals. The most signifi-
cant market of that kind was the farm commodities ex-
change-the futures market. This market had no direct bearing
on the terms of the agreement between Wood and Lucy; but the
market did result from factors similar to those which produced
the output and requirements contracts. Furthermore, the futures
market spawned frequent litigation, much of which served to
move courts away from the doctrines of the past, toward a
greater acceptance of uncertainty and, therefore, toward accept-
ance of requirements and output contracts.
The futures market developed in the context of the three-
decade-long downward trend in the prices of farm products. But
even the trend was not dependable; farmers also faced unpre-
dictable seasonal fluctuations in prices for their crops.83 The
fluctuations seemed all the more damaging because they resulted
from the new, wider national market for farm produce. By the
end of Reconstruction, farming too had ceased to be a regional
activity. Instead, crops from one area of the country rapidly
traveled the rails to other areas."
Efforts to stabilize the price fluctuations and to spread the
risks of other price movements concentrated upon the futures
market.8 5 The formal structure of the arrangement was that a
83. B. BAILYN, D. DAVIS, D. DONALD, J. THOMAS, R. WIEBE, & G. WOOD, THE GREAT
REPUBLI 792-94, 849-56 (1977) (discussion of effect of lower prices on farmers); R. WAT-
SON, JR., supra note 6, at 21 (mechanization helped produce oversupply of farm products
and, in turn, lower prices). But see S. LEE & P. PASSELL, supra note 33, at 294-97 (data
shows all prices declined during period 1870-1900; ratio of farm prices to other prices did
not vary significantly during period); S. RATNER, J. SOLTOW, & R. SYLLA, supra note 34, at
268. For a contemporaneous account of the plight of the farmers, see W. PEFFER, supra
note 24; Welch, The Farmer's Changed Condition, 10 THE FORUM 689, 689, 692 (1891)
(change from time when most trade was by barter to time when farmers produce sup-
plies for the market).
84. The American farmer also became part of an international market. R. Hop-
STADTER, supra note 34, at 50-52.
85. J. ARONI, FUTURES (1882) (account of history and rules of New Orleans Cotton
Exchange); J. BAER & 0. SAXEN, COMMODITY EXCHANGES & FUTURES TRADING (1949); A.
CHANDLER, supra note 36, at 209-15; MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES, supra note 63, at 19 ("In
the 1850s, commodity dealers who bought directly from farmers and sold directly to
processors quickly replaced factors and other types of commission merchants in market-
ing agricultural crops."); C. COWING, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS, AND PROGRESSIVES 3-74
(1965); E. DOUGLASS, supra note 70, at 403-04, 416 (futures contracts protect against
price fluctuations and help maintain stable prices); G. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING 8, 13-
57 (1932) ("In the United States, future trading had its origin just prior to the Civil War
in grain and pork products. Cotton followed in the latter part of the sixties, coffee in
1988]
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farmer would contract in advance of harvest to sell a particular
crop-in effect an output contract. Known as a "forward con-
tract," this type of agreement permitted farmers to protect
themselves against downturns in price. The buyer could then
choose to bear the risk of a fall in price (accepting, of course, the
benefits of an increase in price). Alternatively, the buyer could
sell the contract in the futures market, thereby shifting some or
all of the risk to others.
IV. Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon-THE LAW
A. The Litigation Between Lucy and Wood
No doubt most of the parties who adopted the new con-
tracting practices never had occasion to test them in court. The
first of those who did find themselves involved in litigation, how-
ever, had little reason to be confident of the outcome. The very
fact of litigation usually meant that the contract had not pro-
tected the parties from fluctuation of the market, as they had
hoped. Furthermore, once the contract failed, the nature of the
transaction meant that the open term would be the very one
seized upon by the party seeking to benefit from the change in
the economy. With the dispute thereby focused on the open
term, the parties presented a direct challenge to the fundamen-
tal doctrine that there had to be sufficient certainty for an agree-
ment to be enforced as a contract.86
1882, cottonseed oil in 1904 and raw sugar in 1914."); H. IRWIN, EvOLUTION OF FUTURES
TRADING (1954); J. LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, 1859-1905 (1979); S. RATNER, J.
SOLTOW, & R. SYLLA, supra note 34, at 256; R. WIESE, supra note 1, at 73 (cotton ex-
change viewed as "alien" enemy invading the small communities; threat of outsiders to
take away local control); Bakken, Historical Evaluation, Theory, and Legal Status of
Futures Trading in American Agricultural Commodities, in 1 FUTURES TRADING SEMI-
NAB 3 (1960); Chapman & Knoop, Dealings in Futures on the Cotton Market, 69 J.
ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC. (ser. A.) 321 (1906); Dumbell, The Origin of Cotton Futures, 1
EcoN. HIST. 259 (1927); Stevens, "Futures" in the Wheat Market, 2 Q.J. ECON. 37 (1887).
For early cases, see Porter v. Viets, 19 F. Cas. 1077 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1857) (No. 11,291); Low
v. Forbes, 18 Ill. 568 (1857). For a fictional treatment of futures trading, see F. NORRIS,
THE PIT (1903).
86. As A.W.B. Simpson has found, the doctrine is an old one, dating from as early
as the seventeenth century; the rule is as much one of evidence as it is of contract law:
The rule that the promise must be clear and certain is intimately associated
with the whole system of pleading to an issue, and, as Stephen explains, to
"the nature of the original constitution of the trial by jury," which led to the
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At this juncture, Lucy departed from her role as model.
There was no disruption in the market for her endorsements.
Instead, she brought Wood's lawsuit upon herself when, in one
of the more innovative decisions of her career, she arranged with
Sears, Roebuck and Company to sell her dresses through its cat-
alogues.87 Sears published the first catalogue (which it called a
"portfolio") of Lucy's designs for the fall and winter of 1916-
1917.8 That Lucy was once again at the forefront of commercial
practice was evident from a comment in the trade journal
Printer's Ink, which reported that the announcement of the
agreement threw "a bomb into the camp of rival mail-order
houses." The announcement, the journal further explained, was
"by far the most spectacular bid for prestige which this daring
advertiser [Sears] has made since it first announced the new
handy edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica."89
The primary consequence of the arrangement with Sears,
however, was to provoke Wood to sue for breach of his agree-
insistence upon certainty in the issue. If in the action of assumpsit this cer-
tainty in the issue was to be achieved, the promise must itself be averred with
certainty, and numerous cases illustrate this. The principle applied both to the
promise sued upon and to a promise averred as a consideration, for the latter
was not a good consideration unless itself actionable, and to be actionable it
must be certain.
A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF
AsSUMPSIT 532 (1975) (footnote omitted). By the late nineteenth century the doctrine
was well-established as part of American contract law. See, e.g., 1 C. BEACH, A TREATISE
ON THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 94 (1896).
87. Lucy's decision to work with Sears recalled but another example of the intru-
sion of urban life into rural communities, in this instance through mail-order catalogues.
Cf. H. MAY, supra note 1, at 95 (village retailers complain of mail-order houses taking
business to towns); J. QUANDT, supra note 4, at 17 (quoting Frederick Allan White's edi-
torial complaint about mail order houses:
"The mail order house unrestricted will kill our smaller towns, creating great
cities with their ... inevitable caste feeling that comes from the presence of
strangers who are rich and poor living side by side. Friendship, neighborliness,
fraternity or whatever you may call that spirit of comradery that comes when
men know one another well, is the cement that holds together this union of
states.").
88. Portfolio of Lady Duff-Gordon's Original Designs 4 (Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
Fall & Winter 1916-1917). For advertisements of the portfolio, see HARPER'S BAZAAR,
Oct. 1916, at 100-01; MCCALL'S MAG., Nov. 1916, at 92-93.
89. Sears-Roebuck's Latest Advertising Coup, PRmrR'S INK, Sept. 21, 1916, at 28;
see also G. WEIL, SEARS, ROEBUCK, U.S. 68 (1977); THE ADVERTISING NEWS, Sept. 29,
1916, at 10-11. Despite the excitement created by the announcement, the scheme was a
failure. Sears lost more than a quarter of a million dollars on the two portfolios that it
published. B. EMMET & J. JEUCK, CATALOGUES AND COUNTERS 225 (1950).
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ment with Lucy.90 As noted previously, Lucy relied upon the
traditional response that the agreement lacked mutuality. She
lost the first round of the suit when the trial judge denied her
motion for judgment on the pleadings. He interpreted the agree-
ment as requiring Wood to exercise his "bona fide judgment"-a
requirement which the judge thought sufficient to prevent the
agreement from being unenforceable.9 1 The appellate division
unanimously reversed, concluding that the contract was "void
for lack of mutuality." 2 The court held that the agreement did
not require Wood to place any endorsements. Viewed in that
light, nothing in the agreement could be enforced against Wood.
The disagreement between the two lower New York courts
precisely reflected the fluid state of contract doctrine at the turn
of the century. Poised between the traditional rule of the appel-
late division and the modern rule of the trial court, judges
throughout the country strove to articulate values in response to
the new contractual devices. The "open" nature of the contract
between Lucy and Wood challenged the venerated rule of con-
tract law that there could be no contract unless the obligations
of the parties were mutual.9 3 A late-nineteenth-century Ameri-
can editor of a respected English treatise on contracts phrased
the rule this way: "When the only consideration to sustain the
contract is that arising out of mutual promises, the mutuality
must be absolute so that each party may have an action in case
90. In his complaint Wood mentioned one other endorsement by Lucy-one for the
Chalmers Motor Car Company. Amended Complaint of Plaintiff, included in Papers on
Appeal at 10, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). For
an advertisement by Chalmers featuring Lucy's design of the interior of an automobile,
see VOGUE, Oct. 15, 1916, at 17. For another advertisement featuring Lucy, see N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1916, at 4, col. 7 (Oliver Typewriter Co. offered free pattern of Lucy's
"The Ideal Office Gown.").
91. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1917), reprinted in
Papers on Appeal at 13, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214
(1917).
92. 177 A.D. 624, 627, 164 N.Y.S. 576, 578 (1917).
93. See, e.g., Nichols v. Raynbred, Hob. 88, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1614); 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *445; J. POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
AGREEMENTS *360 ("Mutual promises ... must be both made at the same time, or else
they will be both nuda pacta."). For a statement of the rule, see, e.g., C. LANGDELL, A
SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 103 (2d ed. 1880). For a discussion of the require-
ment of mutuality in terms of exclusive agency contracts like that in Wood, see Sears,
Mutuality of Contracts; Promise for a Promise; Unilateral Contracts; Consideration, 32
AM. L. REv. 409 (1898).
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of breach or neither is bound. '94 The rule could be satisfied only
if there were obligations to be imposed on both sides; if an obli-
gation was not fully described, it was not enforceable.
The traditional doctrine formally barred enforcement of the
new contracts which left portions of obligations to be defined
after the moment of agreement. For example, under an output
contract the buyer promised to purchase whatever the seller pro-
duced; but, some reasoned, there was no obligation on the part
of the seller to produce anything. Similarly, under a require-
ments contract the seller agreed to sell whatever quantity the
buyer ordered; but the buyer had no obligation to order any-
thing.9 5 The objection to these new contracts was neither new
nor unusual. It could present an aristocratic lineage from a clas-
sic such as Pothier's century-old Treatise on Obligations:
It is of the essence of agreements which consist in promising
something, that they produce in the person who made the
promise an obligation that binds him to perform it. Hence it
follows that as there is nothing more contrary to the obligation
than the absolute freedom which might be left to him, to do or
not to do what he promised, the agreement which would leave
this entire freedom, would be absolutely void, on account of
the want of obligation. If then, for example, I were to agree
with you to give you a certain thing, if I please, the agreement
94. W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS
RELATION TO CONTRACT 93 n.2 (J. Knowlton 2d Amer. ed. 1887). For other statements of
the same rule, often in virtually identical language, see C. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS *22 (E. Ingersoll 2d Amer. ed. 1857); 1 C. BEACH, supra note 86, at
214; J. BISHOP, THE DOCTRI S OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 152 (1878); W. CLARK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 165-66 (1894); J. LAWSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN
LAW OF CONTRACTS 108 (1893). As if to demonstrate its antiquity, the rule had a Latin
version, ex nudo pacto, non oritur actio. See H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS
509-10 (R. Kersley 10th ed. 1939); J. SMITH, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: A COURSE OF LEC-
TURES *86 (W. Rawls 3d Amer. ed. 1853).
95. See, e.g., Fallon v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 485 (1874);
Savannah Ice-Delivery Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 110 Ga. 142, 145, 35
S.E. 280, 281 (1900) (dictum); Campbell v. A. Lambert & Co., 36 La. Ann. 35, 37 (1884)
(contract to deliver requirements of coal in 1879); see also American Cotton Oil Co. v.
Kirk, 68 F. 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1895); Kenan, McKay & Spier v. Home Fertilizer & Cotton
Oil Co., 202 Ala. 29, 31, 79 So. 367, 369 (1918); American Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Chilton, 94 IM. App. 6, 9 (1901). Not all of the early cases held that the requirements
contract was unenforceable. S.B. Smith & Co. v. R.S. Morse & Co., 20 La. Ann. 220, 222
(1868)(enforcing contract to supply all the ice required for use in hotel for five years);
Cherry v. Smith, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 19, 24 (1842) (enforcing contract to ship up to 150
barrels of salt "when called on").
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would be absolutely void."6
As a result, the very reasons that made the new types of agree-
ments attractive proved to be the basis for denying enforcement.
The evidence of widespread use of the contracts created a
dilemma for the courts, a dilemma that emphasized to the
judges the weakening power of the past. If they adhered to pre-
cedent they would impede what appeared to be a needed con-
tractual practice; if they were to enforce the new agreements,
they had to develop a new rationale. They chose to enforce the
agreements, but to explain the conclusion in terms of the adage
id certum est quod certum reddi potest (that is certain which
can be made certain). 7 By doing so, the courts were able to
change outcomes while appearing to adhere to the old form
which required mutuality of obligation. In reality the courts put
a markedly different content into that old form. The new con-
tent was the result of questions about the nature of obligations
that arose once courts decided to enforce the agreements. Could,
for example, a buyer seek to profit from a change in the econ-
omy and substantially increase its orders from a seller who had
agreed to furnish the buyer's requirements? The courts might
well have declared the agreements enforceable to the full extent
of whatever requirements (or output) a party had. It would not
have been implausible to expect that the market and contracting
practice would adapt to those circumstances.9 s
But the courts chose not to take that course. Instead of
96. 1 R. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS CONSIDERED IN A MORAL AND LEGAL
VIEw 33 (Eng. trans. Newbern, N.C. 1802).
97. See, e.g., Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 114 F. 77, 79
(8th Cir. 1902); Parker v. Pettit, 43 N.J.L. 512, 515 (1881); H. BROOM, supra note 94, at
422-25; W. CLARK, supra note 94, at 63-65; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78; 2 id. at
*143.
98. The possible adaptations are many, both formal and informal. An example of a
formal adaptation would be to place limits on the obligation of a party to buy or to sell.
See, e.g., Staver Carriage Co. v. Park Steel Co., 104 F. 200 (7th Cir. 1900) (minimum
quantity fixed for requirements contract); Bloomington Canning Co. v. United Can Co.,
94 Ill. App. 62 (1901) (maximum quantity in requirements contracts); Connersville
Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123, 76 N.E. 294 (1905) (minimum and
maximum quantity); East v. Cayuga Lake Ice Line, 21 N.Y.S. 887 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (maxi-
mum quantity in requirements contract); Walsh v. Myers, 92 Wis. 397, 66 N.W. 250
(1896) (minimum quantity in exclusive dealing contract). An example of an informal ad-
aptation would be for the other parties in the market to refuse to deal with a party who




bowing fully to the values of the market,99 the judges sought to
preserve some of the values of the past by requiring that the
contracts be performed in good faith, the "bona fide judgment"
required by the trial judge in Wood. The key characteristic of
the new content for the old form was that the courts, not the
parties or the market, would have the primary role in determin-
ing what was good faith. Consequently, the courts had both a
new focus for their deliberations-performance rather than obli-
gation-and a new standard for judgment-good faith. Together
the new focus and the new standard would make the courts
much more involved in supervising the performance of contracts.
B. The Changing Economic Milieu-Output and
Requirements Contracts
No pair of cases better illustrates the competing doctrine
and the conflict between values of the traditional community
and those of the modern commercial nation than Bailey v. Aus-
trian00 and Wells v. Alexandre.1'0 Bailey arose in the farming
state of Minnesota; yet the product involved, pig iron, indicates
that industry had begun to intrude. In dispute was an agreement
made in 1871 for the supply of all the Lake Superior pig iron
that the plaintiff would "want" for its foundry in St. Paul during
a specified period. Without inquiring into the needs of com-
merce, the Supreme Court of Minnesota recited the refrain that
there could be no mutuality of obligation unless "'each party
has the right at once to hold the other to a positive agree-
ment.' ,,1o2 The contract lacked mutuality, the court reasoned,
99. For an argument that the judges sided with mercantile interests, see Feinman,
Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Gabel & Feinman,
Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE C~rriQUE 172 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
100. 19 Minn. 535 (1873). Cases following Bailey include A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto
F. Lange Co., 155 F. 719, 723 (8th Cir. 1907); McCaw Mfg. Co. v. Felder & Rountree, 115
Ga. 408, 413, 41 S.E. 664, 666 (1902); Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers Lumber
Co., 189 Iowa 1183, 1190, 179 N.W. 417, 420 (1920); Tarbox v. Gotzian, 20 Minn. 139, 141
(1873). See generally Lavery, The Doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian, 10 MINN. L. REV. 584
(1926) (historical analysis of the Bailey doctrine).
101. 130 N.Y. 642, 29 N.E. 142 (1891). Almost half a century later Wells would be
described as "[p]erhaps the leading case in support of the validity of" requirements con-
tracts. Note, Contracts-"Requirements" Contracts-Mutuality of Obligation, 11 No-
TR DAME LAW. 227, 227 (1936).
102. 19 Minn. at 537 (quoting 1 T. PARSON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 449 (6th ed.
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because the plaintiff had not promised to "want" any pig iron;
the plaintiff had not even obligated itself to stay in business."0 3
There was, therefore, no contract on which the plaintiff could
recover. The court's reasoning reflected the image of a tradi-
tional economy in which a single transaction held no promise of
continued dealings between the parties.
The image of a quite different economy, the more complex
"modern" economy, revealed itself in the New York decision in
Wells. The dispute in that case arose out of an agreement in
which the plaintiff promised to furnish the defendant's steamers
"'with strictly free-burning pea [coal] . . . for the year
1888. "104 The defendants bought coal from the plaintiff for six
months before selling their steamships to another company. The
defendants then argued that they had no further requirements
for coal. The Court of Appeals of New York readily recognized
the nature of the commerce involved: the defendant's steam-
ships, which ran between New York and Cuba or Mexico, re-
quired large, but uncertain, quantities of coal. "It is very clear,"
the court wrote, "that the language employed by plaintiff in the
light of surrounding circumstances was intended to make as def-
inite as possible, the quantity of coal which the defendants
would be required to take."'10 5
Two aspects of the Wells opinion illustrate the very differ-
ent assumptions that the two courts held about the nature of the
economy and of contract. First, unlike the Minnesota court, the
New York court perceived that uncertainty was implicit in com-
mercial practices. To the New York court the indefiniteness of
the agreement was a reflection of the market, not of the parties'
failure to agree. The court, therefore, did not allow the defend-
ant to use the uncertainty to avoid the obligation which the
court found implicit in the agreement. Second, the two courts
differed in their views of the relationship between the parties.
For the Minnesota court the relationship was discrete and based
on a single transaction. The court's conclusion that the defend-
1873)). For other cases in which the word "want" proved fatal to the enforceability of an
agreement, see Higbie v. Rust, 211 Ill. 333, 71 N.E. 1010 (1904); Drake v. Vorse, 52 Iowa
417, 3 N.W. 465 (1879).
103. 19 Minn. at 537.
104. 56 N.Y. Super. Ct. Rep. (24 J. & S.) 542, 544 (1889).
105. 130 N.Y. at 644, 29 N.E. at 143.
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ant had no obligation to stay in business was, therefore, inter-
nally consistent. For the New York court, by contrast, the rela-
tionship was continuing. It therefore made no sense for the
steamship company to avoid its obligations by selling its assets
to another company.106
A third difference between the two courts arose as a conse-
quence of the New York court's decision to enforce the agree-
ment. The Minnesota court was not troubled by questions of
performance; it simply found no obligation to perform. The New
York court, however, had to consider performance-in particu-
lar, whether the defendant was obligated to order the coal. The
court resolved that question by turning to notions of reasonable-
ness and fairness-a preview of the development of "good faith."
The court thought it clear that the agreement required the de-
fendant to give notice of its needs. "[A]ny other construction,"
the court announced as it implicitly gave content to the notion
of good faith, "would make the contract unreasonable, and place
one of the parties entirely at the mercy of the other.' 10 Quite
plainly, the court was not prepared to approve a contract in
which something approaching commercial Darwinism would pre-
vail. The court was willing to entertain the new contract prac-
106. Although other courts would later be troubled over whether a party was obli-
gated to stay in business, The Wells court had no difficulty. Its penultimate sentence
simply declared that "the provisions of the agreement do not admit of a construction
that it was to terminate in the event of a sale or other disposition of [the steamships] by
the defendants." Id. at 646, 29 N.E. at 143. The Minnesota court had been equally didac-
tic in reaching the opposite conclusion. 19 Minn. at 537. For later discussions of whether
a party had to stay in business, see, e.g., In re United Cigar Stores Co., 8 F. Supp. 243,
244 (S.D.N.Y.) (buyer not obligated to stay in business), aff'd, 72 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Consolidated Dairy Products Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 293 U.S. 617
(1934); Chalmers & Williams v. Walter Bledsoe & Co., 218 Ill. App. 363, 367-72 (1920)
(contract for requirements of coal; buyer changes from steam power to electricity thereby
reducing need for coal); C.A. Andrews Coal Co. v. Directors of Pub. Schools, 151 La. 695,
92 So. 303 (1922) (seller not obligated to sell more coal if buyer changes to a type of
furnace requiring more coal); Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 611, 82 N.W. 241 (1900) (con-
tract to supply requirements of ice for established business for five years "presupposed"
that business would exist for those five years); Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing
Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 118 N.E. 618 (1918) (expenditures by one party on plant for second
party may require second party to stay in business for term of output contract or until
minimum quantity is produced); Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mendleson, 180 A.D. 9, 167
N.Y.S. 435 (1917) (implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing means that buyer
cannot order for speculative purposes); McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co.,
138 Pa. 184, 20 A. 938 (1890) (contract for requirements of coal does not preclude buyer
from drilling gas well which reduces need for coal).
107. 130 N.Y. at 645, 29 N.E. at 143.
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tices, but it was not so willing to embrace the commercial values
of the emerging modern society.
For the final quarter of the nineteenth century courts strug-
gled with the new contractual practices. By the early years of
the twentieth century, however, the reasoning that appeared in
Wells began to emerge as dominant. Even the Supreme Court of
Minnesota eventually relented. In 1901 it effectively overruled
Bailey in Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co.108 The dis-
pute in Ames-Brooks arose over the provision of insurance on
grain shipments on the Great Lakes for the shipping season of
1899. Aetna had provided insurance in the past and agreed that
it would do so for that year. When the market rates subse-
quently increased, however, the Aetna syndicate sought to es-
cape any obligation by arguing that the agreement lacked mutu-
ality because Ames-Brooks had not agreed to have any
shipments during the year. Reflecting traditional doctrine (and,
of course, the precedent of Bailey), the trial court agreed with
Aetna. But the supreme court disagreed, explaining that it must
"interpret the contract from the standpoint of the practical bus-
iness men who made it.'10 9
Loath to abandon the old forms and precedents, the court
attempted to distinguish earlier decisions such as Bailey by
pointing out that those agreements had lacked mutuality. Echo-
ing Wells, the court portrayed Ames-Brooks as factually differ-
ent because its plaintiff had an established business which re-
quired insurance on its cargoes. The court reasoned that the
plaintiff intended to remain in business for another year and
had promised to buy its insurance from Aetna, a promise which
108. 83 Minn. 346, 350, 86 N.W. 344, 346 (1901). See City of Marshall v. Kalman,
153 Minn. 320, 324-25, 190 N.W. 597, 599 (1922); Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Goodnow, 40
Minn. 497, 498, 42 N.W. 356, 356-57 (1889); 9 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, Con-
tracts, 213, 330 n.24 (W. Mack & H. Nash eds. 1903).
109. Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 83 Minn. 346, 349, 86 N.W. 344, 345 (1901);
cf. The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U.S. 12, 24 (1917) ("Business contracts must be con-
strued with business sense, as they naturally would be understood by intelligent men of
affairs."); T.B. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 200 F. 529, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1912) (con-
tract to fulfill buyer's needs obligates seller to supply sufficient quantities of beef in ac-
cordance with buyer's customary business operation); Minnesota Lumber Co. v.
Whitebreast Coal Co., 160 ll. 85, 93, 43 N.E. 774, 777 (1895) (court presumed parties
placed a reasonable construction on the term "requirements"); Warden Coal Washing
Co. v. Meyer, 98 Ill. App. 640, 643 (1901) (parties' agreement to deliver coal in amount
needed by buyer was not void for lack of mutuality because it was reasonable to assume
they were practical businessmen).
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included a promise not to buy from anyone else.11
The court's attempt to distinguish the earlier cases
amounted to little more than the jurist's version of the poet's
search for new forms. Whereas the poet had the luxury of es-
chewing rhyme and meter in favor of free verse, the judge felt no
such freedom. Judges who preferred the new doctrine had to en-
close it in old forms. The plaintiff in Ames-Brooks had no more
of an explicit obligation to buy insurance than the plaintiff in
Bailey had an obligation to buy pig iron. Both plaintiffs had
ongoing businesses which depended upon the subject of the con-
tract for operation. If each business was to continue, it would
require some quantity of the product, either iron or insurance.
The cases, therefore, were not different in fact. The only distinc-
tion lay in the different assumptions held by the courts about
the market. For the Bailey court the market comprised distinct,
one-time transactions; for the Ames-Brooks court the market
comprised transactions of a continuing nature. To the Bailey
court it was utterly unreasonable to think that a party might
promise to stay in business; to the Ames-Brooks court the
thought was both reasonable and probable.
Over time, more and more courts reflected their recognition
of the new commercial market as they began to enforce agree-
ments with open terms. The economic development of the coun-
try seemed to crush the doctrinal formalism that had resisted
the development of new contractual devices.m Slowly, the
110. 83 Minn. at 350, 86 N.W. at 346; see also National Furnace Co. v. Keystone
Mfg. Co., 110 Il1. 427, 434 (1884) (manufacturer only bound to buy supplies needed in
upcoming year from supplier; contract was enforceable because manufacturer was obli-
gated to buy or else close business); Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 611, 614-15, 82 N.W.
241, 242-43 (1900) (court traces process of distinguishing Bailey v. Austrian, 19 Minn.
535 (1873)).
111. See Scott v. T.W. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 159-60, 153 N.W. 316, 319
(1915). A Delaware court made the same point five years later:
A very strict rule was declared in Bailey v. Austrian and other early cases,
respecting mutuality and certainty in contracts involving all of the buyer's re-
quirements or consumption of goods purchased. But this rule has been some-
what modified on account of the growth and exigencies of business, and the
later cases are rather uniform in holding that such contracts are not void for
lack of mutuality and certainty, if in the light of surrounding circumstances
the quantity contracted for can reasonably be ascertained or is capable of be-
ing approximately ascertained at the time of making the agreement.
American Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co., 31 Del. 65, 84, 111 A. 290, 298
(Super. Ct. 1920) (citation omitted); see also American Publishing & Engraving Co. v.
1988] 447
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
courts came to realize the futility of attempting to deter ship-
ments of products such as iron and bolts,112 wheels,113 fertiliz-
ers,11 and the ubiquitous railroad ties." 5
The realization came from courts throughout the nation,
seemingly reflecting the nationalization of the economy that had
contributed to the problem in the first place. Significant state-
Walker, 87 Mo. App. 503, 506-07 (1901) (contract binding on both parties when formal
acceptance made and performance begun); Excelsior Wrapper Co. v. Messinger, 116 Wis.
549, 555-56, 93 N.W. 459, 461 (1903)(recognizing the trend of decisions finding mutuality
in contracts in which established businesses intend to be bound by requirments
contract).
One court effectively stood the principle of mutuality on its head. After concluding
that one party was bound by the contract the court noted that "the principle of mutual-
ity, which is an essential element of every contract, compels a ruling that the other party
shall also be bound by the terms of the contract, in order to make it a binding agree-
ment." Dawson Cotton Oil Co. v. Kenan, McKay & Speir, 21 Ga. App. 688, 695, 94 S.E.
1037, 1040 (1918); see also Lewis v. Atlas Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61 Mo. 534, 538 (1876) (if
one party was bound "it necessarily follows that [the other party] must also have been
bound"). Professor Friedrich Kessler and Professor Grant Gilmore had the following to
say about the developments:
It is surely one of the more discreditable episodes in our history that for a
generation or more the argument could be seriously made that there was no
contract because the buyer's promise to buy his requirements was "illusory"
and therefore, no consideration for the seller's promise to sell. The eventual
good sense represents, chronologically, one of the earliest instances in which
obvious commercial needs and pressures forced the reversal of a position ini-
tially based on apparently logical deductions from nineteenth century consid-
eration theory.
F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, TEACHER'S MANUAL CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 26
(1972).
112. Cf. Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 114 F. 77, 81 (8th
Cir. 1902) (contract unenforceable but court recognized validity of contract if quantity
was ascertainable with reasonable certainty).
113. Stayer Carriage Co. v. Park Steel Co., 220 Ill. 412, 77 N.E. 174 (1906); see Con-
nersville Wagon Co. v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123, 76 N.E. 294 (1905); Cooper
v. Lansing Wheel Co., 94 Mich. 272, 54 N.W. 39 (1892).
114. See Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298 (6th Cir.
1903); Aetna Explosives Co. v. Diamond Alkali Co., 277 Pa. 392, 121 A. 201 (1923) (con-
tract for 1916). Contra American Agric. Chem. Co. v. Kennedy & Crawford, 103 Va. 171,
48 S.E. 868 (1904) (contract dated 1902).
115, See McIntyre Lumber & Export Co. v. Jackson Lumber Co., 165 Ala. 268, 51
So. 767 (1910); Fontaine v. Baxley, Boles & Co., 90 Ga. 416, 17 S.E. 1015 (1892); Laclede
Constr. Co. v. T.J. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25, 84 S.W. 76 (1904). Contra Hazelhurst
Lumber Co. v. Mercantile Lumber & Supply Co., 166 F. 191 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1908); Bag-
nell Timber Co. v. Spann, 102 Ark. 621, 145 S.W. 546 (1912); Hudson v. Browning, 264
Mo. 58, 174 S.W. 393 (1915). For a review of the current state of the law, see Speidel,
Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 785
(1982).
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ments of the new doctrine came from New York,1 ' which by
1920 had become the commercial center for the nation. The less
commercially developed states had a less consistent pattern of
approving the new contracts, but they approved them nonethe-
less. One of the earliest decisions to uphold a requirements con-
tract came from the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 1868.117 The
agreement at issue called for furnishing "all the ice [a hotel]
may require." The court held that the contract was not void for
want of mutuality, and noted that the hotel would breach the
contract if it bought ice elsewhere." 8 The supreme courts of
both Illinois and Ohio followed that Louisiana decision." 9 Far-
ther west, courts from Missouri to Utah approved the con-
tracts, 20 with the Missouri Court of Appeals responding tersely
that the argument that an output contract lacked mutuality was
"more specious than sound.11 21
116. As already discussed, Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N.Y. 642, 29 N.E. 142 (1891), was
one of the major cases of the period. See supra text accompanying notes 101-110; see
also, e.g., Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 118 N.E. 618 (1918)
(output contract enforceable); New York Cent. Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator
Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903) (requirements contract enforceable); Baker Trans-
fer Co. v. Merchants' Refrigerating & Ice Mfg. Co., 1 A.D. 507, 37 N.Y.S. 276 (1896)
(output contract enforceable); Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263, 174
N.Y.S. 440 (1919) (requirements contract enforceable). For cases from other of the more
urban states, see e.g., Bartlett Springs Co. v. Standard Box Co., 16 Cal. App. 671, 117 P.
934 (1911) (requirements contract enforceable); Staver Carriage Co. v. Park Steel Co.,
220 Ill. 412, 77 N.E. 174 (1906) (requirements contract enforceable); National Furnace
Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427 (1884) (requirements contract enforceable); Rus-
sell, Burdsall & Ward, Inc. v. Excelsior Stove & Mfg. Co., 120 IlM. App. 23 (1905) (re-
quirements contract enforceable).
117. S.B. Smith & Co. v. R.S. Morse & Co., 20 La. Ann. 220, 222 (1868).
118. Id. at 222. But cf. Campbell v. A. Lambert & Co., 36 La. Ann. 35 (1884) (agree-
ment to deliver coal "as may be required" lacks mutuality). For other decisions from
predominantly rural states, see, e.g., McIntyre Lumber & Export Co. v. Jackson Lumber
Co., 165 Ala. 268, 51 So. 767 (1910) (output contract is binding); El Dorado Ice & Plan-
ing Mill Co. v. Kinard, 96 Ark. 184, 131 S.W. 460 (1910) (output contract enforceable);
Thomas-Huycke-Martin Co. v. T. M. Gray & Sons, 94 Ark. 9, 125 S.W. 659 (1910) (out-
put contract binding); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. 0. T. O'Bannon & Co., 164 Ky. 34, 174
S.W. 783 (1915) (output contract enforced).
119. National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 111. 427 (1884); Cincinnati, S. &
C. R.R. v. Consolidated Coal & Mining Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 365 (Cincinnati Super.
Ct. 1882), rev'd, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 15 (Hamilton Dist. Ct. 1883), aff'd, id. at 15 n. t
(1887).
120. See Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 47 Utah 108, 151 P. 984 (1915) (re-
quirements contract binding).
121. Rozier v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 147 Mo. App. 290, 297, 126 S.W. 532, 534
(1910); see also Spencer v. Taylor, 69 Kan. 493, 77 P. 276 (1904) (requirements contract
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To be sure, part of the development in contract doctrine
may be attributed to the development of business itself. With
more businesses and with a wider spread for the market, courts
had more examples against which they could measure the con-
duct of the parties before them.122 Courts were, therefore, better
able to fill an open term in an agreement by looking to the con-
duct of other, similar parties. But the decisons reflect more than
simply a greater ease of dealing with the facts. The opinions re-
veal both an important intellectual development-the accept-
ance of uncertainty-and the beginning of a critical doctrinal
development-the policing of standards of performance. As
early as 1882, an Ohio court illustrated the intellectual develop-
ment when it concluded:
It is difficult to see how parties could make contracts for the
supply of quantities uncertain at the time of the contract, but
entirely capable of being made perfectly certain during the
time it is to run, in any other way than that adopted here. The
party proposing merely contracts for the benefit of the
probability or possibility that more or less will be needed by
the other. The party accepting fully secures this to the other
because he is bound not to buy elsewhere.123
binding).
122. For examples of cases dealing with established businesses, see T.B. Walker
Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 200 F. 529, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1912); Lima Locomotive & Mach.
Co. v. National Steel Castings Co., 155 F. 77 (6th Cir. 1907); A. Klipstein & Co. v. Allen,
123 F. 992 (N.D. Ga. 1903); Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., 114 F.
77, 79-80 (8th Cir. 1902); Manhattan Oil Co. v. Richardson Lubricating Co., 113 F. 923,
925 (2d Cir. 1902) (buyer must observe good faith in limiting to legitimate requirements
of business); T. W. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 F. 278, 279-80, 281-82 (S.D.
Cal. 1916), rev'd, 247 F. 958 (9th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 659 (1922); American
Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co., 31 Del. 65, 84, 111 A. 290, 298 (Super.
Ct. 1920) (output contract for vulcanized fiber and insulation paper enforceable); Nelson
v. Barber, 143 La. 783, 79 So. 403, (1918) (requirements contract enforceable in general
but not on facts of this case); S.B. Smith & Co. v. R.S. Morse & Co., 20 La. Ann. 220, 222
(1868) (ice for hotel); E. Richard Meinig Co. v. United States Fastener Co., 200 A.D. 522,
531, 193 N.Y.S. 106, 113 (1922) (self-piercing glove clasps); McCall Co. v. Icks, 107 Wis.
232, 239, 83 N.W. 300, 302 (1900) (McCall patterns).
123. Cincinnati, S. & C. R.R. v. Consolidated Coal & Mining Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Re-
print 365, 367-68 (Cincinnati Super. Ct. 1882), rev'd, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 15 (Hamilton
Dist. Ct. 1883), affd, id. at 15 n.t (1887).
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C. The Changing Legal Milieu-The Futures Market
This critical shift toward acceptance of greater uncertainty
did not occur in just one area of contract law. Rather, much of
the developing contract law at the turn of the century was in
response to the efforts of the contracting parties to deal with
uncertainty. The farni commodities market, in particular, pro-
vides another prime example of the efforts of courts to reconcile
traditional values with the uncertainties of the modern economy.
For requirements and output contracts the competing tradi-
tional doctrine had been mutuality. For the futures market the
conflict came from the early established doctrine that gambling
contracts were immoral and therefore illegal.124 The resilient
doctrine that linked morality and law was a trace of the tradi-
tional community with its shared, stable values. The morals of
the community condemned futures contracts because they
served only to tempt the unsuspecting to invest beyond their
means.125 Moreover, traditional economic values rejected futures
124. The sale of stock provides one early example of opposition to the sale of items
not owned at the time of contracting. See, e.g., Barrett v. Hyde, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 160,
161 (1856) (reference to 1836 law voiding sale of stock not owned at time of contract);
Thompson v. Alger, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 428 (1847) (applying N.Y. law); Stanton v. Small,
3 Sand. 230, 238, 240 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1849) (act proscribing stock jobbing not applicable
to sale of flour for future delivery; seller said to have acted according to law and "accord-
ing to good morals"); Frost v. Clarkson, 7 Cow. 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (citing New York
statute); Brua's Appeal, 55 Pa. 294, 298 (1867). But see Gilchreest v. Pollock, 2 Yeates
18, 21 (Pa. 1795) (contract to pay $24,500 in specie for future delivery of $20,000 of stock
not violative of statute and not immoral) ("The sale of stock is neither unlawful nor
immoral. It is confessed, that an inordinate spirit of speculation approaches to gaming,
and tends to corrupt the morals of the people. When the public mind is thus affected, it
becomes the legislature to interpose. But we have no such law at present."). See gener-
ally T. DEWEY, LEGISLATION AGAINST SPECULATION AND GAMBLING IN THE FORMS OF TRADE
(1905); E. DOUGLASS, supra note 70, at 526-27; Parker, Government Regulation of Specu-
lation, 38 ANNALS 444 (1911). Judge Thomas N. Cooley explained some of the problems
that arose when a transaction took the form of a prohibited gambling deal even though
the transaction was not in substance a gamble. Shaw v. Clark, 49 Mich. 384, 388, 13
N.W. 786, 787-88 (1882); cf. H. FULLER, WITH THE PROCESSION 327 (1895) (character op-
poses speculation even though its gains would mean financial salvation).
125. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820-21 (1879); Cleage v. Laidley,
149 F. 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1906) (testimony about attempt to corner market; result was
bankruptcy); Bailey & Graham v. Phillips, 159 F. 535, 537 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1907) (charge to
jury); Medlin Milling Co. v. Moffatt Comm'n Co., 218 F. 686, 689 (W.D. Mo. 1915) (deal-
ings in futures led to financial embarrassment of company); Bartlett v. Smith, 13 F. 263,
266 (C.C.D. Minn. 1882) (gambling contract in wheat said to be "pernicious"); Ex parte
Young, 30 F. Cas. 828, 832-33 (N.D. Ill. 1874) (No. 18,145) (attempt to corner Chicago
market for oats in 1872); In re Chandler, 13 Am. L. Reg. 310 (1874) (attempt to corner
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contracts because those who profited by the contracts had only a
"fierce greed for gain without labor";12 they produced no goods
and, therefore, added nothing to the country's wealth. 1 7 The
traditional view was well-explained in an issue of the Political
Science Quarterly for 1895. From the standpoint of those op-
posed to futures, the author explained, "the law of supply and
oats market in June 1872); Heard v. Russell & Potter, 59 Ga. 25, 38-39 (1877) (jury
charge condemning speculation); J.B. Lyon & Co. v. Culbertson, Blair & Co., 83 Ill. 33,
38-39 (1876) (danger from market corners); Ohlendorf v. Bennett, 241 Ill. App. 537
(1926) (bank cashier's embezzlement of money over two years to finance speculation
forced bank to close); Beveridge v. Hewitt, 8 IM. App. 467 (1881) (description of financial
ruin of particular individual); Webster v. Sturges, 7 Ill. App. 560, 564 (1880) (option
trading is "baleful and poisonous influence"); Nave v. Wilson, 12 Ind. App. 38, 45, 38
N.E. 876, 878 (1894) (futures trading described as "vicious and demoralizing"); Brua's
Appeal, 55 Pa. 294, 299 (1867) (gambling causes failures and embezzlements); see also F.
NonRis, supra note 85, at 129-31 (wheat futures set artificial prices and entice young
men to gamble); Futures, 33 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 436 (1894); 13 id. 317, 318 (1874) (In a
note, commentator stated that trading in futures, like trading in stock differences, is a
"demoralizing and degrading species of wagering or gambling, [and] is no doubt, gener-
ally reprobated by the lovers of morality and decency throughout the country.").
That speculation and financial embarrassment was not limited to clerks and those
perceived as being in the lower classes is evident from Justh v. Holliday, 13 D.C. (2
Mackey) 346 (1883), which related losses suffered by General George Custer while deal-
ing in the market in 1875 and 1876, shortly before his death in the battle of the Little
Big Horn in June 1876. The court in Justh wrote that the "extent of this form of specu-
lation [in stock] now rife in our country is unprecedented, unless perhaps by the almost
universal gambling transactions that distinguished the era of the famous South Sea Bub-
ble." Id. at 349. In a note following the report of a case, Francis Wharton discussed the
conflicting tendencies of courts in dealing with these issues. See Melchert v. American
Union Tel. Co., 11 F. 193, 201 (C.C.D. Iowa 1882); see also Fictitious Dealing in Agricul-
tural Products: Hearings on Bills Nos. 392, 2699, and 3870 Before the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892). In spite of the complaints, it was not until the
early 1920s that Congress passed legislation regulating futures trading. C. COWING, supra
note 85, at 261; 1 T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODxTIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS
MARKETS 5f 9.03-.07, at 9-5 to 9-14 (1893).
126. Justh v. Holliday, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 346, 349 (1883).
127. Sawyer, Wallace & Co. v. Taggart, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 727 (1879):
The objection to commercial gambling is that men enter into fictitious con-
tracts, and buy and sell upon contracts never intended to be performed by
themselves or any one else, but the character of their transactions being un-
known to the public, they are regarded as real, and so affect prices and trade
without having any legitimate connection in fact with either.
Id. at 735. Williams v. Tiedemann, 6 Mo. App. 269, 275 (1878) (a settlement without
actual delivery adds nothing to the "commercial prosperity" of the country); Kirkpatrick
v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 155, 158 (1872) (speculation on price of petroleum "destructive of good
morals and fair dealing, and of the best interests of the community"); J. LuRIE, supra
note 85, at 63; see also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 60 (speculation viewed as "a crime
against the economy"); W. NUGENT, supra note 1, at 43-44 (the perceived "moral superi-
ority" of producers).
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demand is a moral law. [They hold] that prices ought to be de-
termined by supply and demand and that it is wicked to deter-
mine them in any other way." What the opponents of futures
failed to recognize, according to the author's modern, pragmatic
perspective, was "that the 'law of supply and demand,' like any
economic law, is merely a statement of facts." Reflecting the
change from a stable, traditional economy to an uncertain one,
the author went on to accuse the opponents of taking "the medi-
aeval view of price as an objective something, springing full-
fledged from a physical supply and a definite demand."'28 The
accuracy of the accusation is exemplified by statements such as
one in a Georgia case involving dealings in cotton futures. The
judge instructed the jury that a person who speculated in fu-
tures "interfere[d] with the natural laws of trade."'29 With fu-
tures contracts thus doubly condemned, by traditional morals
and by traditional economic values, many rural areas not sur-
prisingly perceived futures trading as no more than another ur-
ban intrusion into the locally controlled community. 30 They
"longed for the antebellum days when economic control had
been more local and therefore more personal.'' 1
For so long as courts did not recognize a commercial value
to futures contracts, they displayed their continuing belief in the
predictability of the economy. In a stable economy there was lit-
tle need to spread the risks of fluctuating prices. Likewise, in an
128. Emery, Legislation Against Futures, 10 POL. ScI. Q. 62, 80 (1895). The follow-
ing year Emery published a book, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges,
which one author termed the "most authoritative work on speculation." C. CowING,
supra note 85, at 47.
129. Heard v. Russell & Potter, 59 Ga. 25, 38 (1877).
130. As early as 1874 the Grange of Illinois "which had never been in sympathy with
the Board of Trade or its methods, favored the passage of a law declaring all transactions
in 'futures' to be gambling operations." 1 C. TAYLOR, HISTORY OF THE BOARD OF TRADE OF
THE CITY OF CHICAGO 501 (1917). For a discussion of the Illinois statute and the related
judicial decisions, see J. LuRm, supra note 85, at 52-74. Julius Aroni provided evidence of
a similar feeling when he bemoaned a jury's decision to invalidate a futures contract:
The masses do not seem yet to be sufficiently educated to the high standard of
progressive commerce; they have not yet learned that in this age of steam and
electricity, time and distance having been almost swept away, large and impor-
tant commercial transactions are no longer carried out in the style of the last
century; so that it was not very difficult to persuade a jury of the immorality of
"future" contracts.
J. ARONi, supra note 85, at 75; see also W. PEFFER, supra note 24, at 123; R. WIEBE, supra
note 1, at 73.
131. C. COWING, supra note 85, at 4.
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economy dominated by local, discrete sales there was no wider
market through which to spread risks. But as had happened
with output and requirements contracts, first the farmers and
then the courts came to recognize that the futures market was
only one aspect of the increasingly advantageous national mar-
ket. The transactions on the various boards of trade became too
large a part of the nation's economic structure for courts to con-
tinue declaring the agreements void, even in the rural states
which so strongly opposed the intrusion from urban America."3 2
The Supreme Court of Kentucky epitomized the courts' realiza-
tion when it wrote in 1879:
so large a portion of the real business in the great cities is done
on 'change [exchange] as to wholly forbid the conclusion that
all contracts made on them are unlawful, and unless such con-
clusion could be reached, the contracts involved here must be
held to have been valid and lawful.13
132. See sources cited supra note 85; see also S. RATNER, J. SOLTOW, & R. SYLLA,
supra note 34, at 376.
133. Sawyer, Wallace & Co. v. Taggart, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 727, 739-40 (1879); see also
Clarke v. Foss, 5 F. Cas. 955 (W.D. Wis. 1878) (No. 2,852):
In the main, commercial transactions must be left to be regulated by the
higher and more inexorable laws which govern the trading world. If the trans-
actions disclosed by this case are illegal, then, undoubtedly, a great part of the
banking and clearing-house transactions in our great commercial centres are
illegal also.
Id. at 960; Pixley v. Boynton, 79 I. 351, 353 (1875) (Contract for future delivery of
wheat was "nothing more than a time contract, which is regarded on the board of trade
and elsewhere as a legitimate and regular contract. Time contracts in relation to grain, as
well as other commodities, are of daily occurrence, and must necessarily be in commer-
cial transactions."); Wolcott v. Heath, 78 IMI. 433, 437 (1875) (time contracts made in
good faith not prohibited); Sanborn v. Benedict, 78 Ill. 309, 315 (1875) (if futures con-
tracts were declared illegal, much American trade and commerce would halt); Bigelow v.
Benedict, 70 N.Y. 202, 205 (1877) (contract for future delivery of gold) ("That there was
an element of hazard in the contract is plain. But the same hazard is incurred in every
optional contract for the sale of any marketable commodity, when, for a consideration
paid, one of the parties binds himself to sell or receive the property at a future time, at a
specified price, at the election of the other."). But see Beadles, Wood & Co. v. McElrath
& Co., 85 Ky. 230, 243, 3 S.W. 152, 156 (1887) (that much legitimate trading is done on
Cotton Exchange does not mean that gambling is also accomplished through the
exchange).
One court even suggested that contracts made over "the great public exchanges of
the country" were presumed to be valid. Gettys v. Newburger, 272 F. 209, 216 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 649 (1921). For other instances of the application of a similar rule,
see, e.g., Cleage v. Laidley, 149 F. 346, 352 (8th Cir. 1906) (contracts for purchase and
sale of grain or other personal property to be delivered in the future are lawful and
valid); cf. Clarke v. Foss, 5 F. Cas. 955, 957-58 (W.D. Wis. 1878) (No. 2,852) (testimony
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Equally important, though, was the growing recognition
that uncertainty and the means to deal with it were a vital part
of the nation's economy. As early as 1876, a judge of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois had expressed that view, though in dis-
sent.13 4 Two points in his opinion illustrate especially well the
growing recognition that the new conditions required new val-
ues. He argued, first, that there was nothing immoral about bet-
ting on risks; it was to be expected in the modern society."3 Sec-
ond, the requirement of margins was quite sensible for those
transactions on exchanges, especially in large cities where the
parties could not be expected to know one another or to take the
time required to investigate the financial position of the other.'
In short, rather than continue to treat the new characteristics of
the modern economy as though they were aberrations, he urged
that they be accepted as the norm.
The most important recognition of speculation as both legit-
imate and beneficial came in 1905 in an opinion by Justice
Holmes. The case, Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 3 7 arose from the Board's efforts to prevent others from us-
ing and distributing quotations of prices from sales of grains and
futures. The Board argued that Christie operated an illegal
about practices of board of trade); Fox v. Steever, 55 IlM. App. 255, 257-60, 262 (1894)
(testimony about operation of board of trade; court concludes that it is not unusual that
commodities change hands many times before actual delivery), afl'd, 156 IM. 622, 40 N.E.
942 (1895); Sawyer, Wallace & Co. v. Taggart, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 727 (1879) (similar point
about trades). But see Huff v. State, 164 Ark. 211, 219, 261 S.W. 654, 657 (1924) (prose-
cution for violation of statute prohibiting certain dealings in futures, no defense that
board of trade rules require delivery).
134. J.B. Lyon & Co. v. Culbertson, Blair & Co., 83 Ill. 33, 53 (1876) (Dickey, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 54.
136. Id. at 33, 53-54; see also Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1883); Mullinix v. Hub-
bard, 6 F.2d 109, 110 (8th Cir. 1925) (deals in accord with rules of exchange provide
"legitimate aid and not obstruction to commerce"); Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N.Y. 202, 205
(1877) (no vice in contract just because it involves risk). See generally H. BRACE, THE
VALUE OF ORGANIZED SPECULATION (1913); H. EMERY, SPECULATION ON THE STOCK AND
PRODUCE EXCHANGES OF THE UNITED STATES (1896); Clews, Transactions on Margin and
for Future Delivery, 12 BENCH & BAR 54, 55 (1908) ("speculation is a motive power of
the first importance"); Emery, supra note 128 (semble); Stevens, The Utility of Specula-
tion in Modern Commerce, 7 POL. SCI. Q. 419 (1892) (speculation is beneficial); Note,
Dealings in Futures, 40 HARv. L. REv. 638, 640 (1927) (speculation beneficial because it
smooths swings of prices).
137. 198 U.S. 236 (1905). See Bakken, supra note 85, at 23; Schonberg, Historical
Evaluation, Theory, and Legal Status of Futures Trading in American Agricultural
Commodities, in 1 FUTURES TRADING SEMINAR 29, 38 (1960).
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"bucket shop" 13  and had no right to use the quotations. Chris-
tie responded that the Board operated the biggest bucket shop
of all and was, therefore, so tainted with illegality that its quota-
tions should not be protected." The Supreme Court sided with
the Board. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes explained:
[I]n a modern market contracts are not confined to sales for
immediate delivery. People will endeavor to forecast the future
and to make agreements according to their prophecy. Specula-
tion of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of
society to the probable. Its value is well known as a means of
avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and pro-
viding for periods of want. 01°
Complete acceptance of uncertainty was evident in a subse-
quent opinion by a federal district judge. The judge explained
his approval of a contract which left open a term setting the
mixture of sizes in a large quantity of prunes:
In construing contracts in which persons seek to cover the con-
tingencies and uncertainties of crops that are yet to mature,
provisions reasonably adapted to that end should not be made
futile and meaningless because they may contain some element
of the "will, wish, or want" of one of the parties. Into each such
stipulation the law will inject the requirement of good faith
and fair dealing. Better is it that there should be some indefi-
niteness and uncertainty in contracts such as these than that
the growers of commodities, and the merchants who deal in
them, should be told that, unless they are able accurately to
foretell what nature holds in store, they cannot safely make
contracts which will in some degree be dependent upon future
events. "1
138. The origins of the term "bucket shop" are unclear. The phrase is a pejorative
which usually refers to a "brokerage house ... whose operators would secretly
'bucket'--i.e., hold out-rather than execute a customer's orders, in the hope that the
house would later be able to buy or sell the stock or commodity at more favourable
prices." 2 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA. MCROPAEDIA 338 (1982); see also
BREWER's DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE 166 (I. Evans. centenary ed. rev. 1981).
139. For Christie's own account of the dispute, see Christie, Bucket Shop vs. The
Board of Trade, 15 EVERYBODY'S MAG. 707 (1906).
140. 198 U.S. at 247.
141. California Prune & Apricot Growers, Inc. v. Wood & Selick, Inc., 2 F.2d 88, 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); cf. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. O.T. O'Bannon & Co., 164 Ky. 34, 36, 174
S.W. 783, 784 (1915) (use of "would" in an oral contract deemed an inadvertence which
did not render agreement unenforceable); Excelsior Wrapper Co. v. Messinger, 116 Wis.
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That opinion confirmed the shift in doctrine that had been an-
ticipated in Wells, with an equal lack of concern for the parties'
choice of verb, whether it be "will" or "want." The opinion also
confirmed that the doctrine of good faith would be used to deal
with the uncertainties inherent in the newly approved
contracts.142
V. Wood v. Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon-Gordon-THE
AFTERMATH
In the process of dealing with uncertainty, many judges
came to realize the inadequacy of particular precedents, the old
forms of the law. Those judges, like many of their contemporar-
ies, sensed the accuracy of what Cardozo had so brashly said as a
student in 1889. The time had come, he observed, "when the old
forms seem[ed] ready to decay, and the old rules of action [had]
lost their binding force.1143 The judiciary responded through ef-
forts to reconcile the old forms of the law with the new forms of
commercial agreement. Once the judges accepted the existence
of a new market, however, they confronted a conflict between
traditional and modern values. In the disputes about perform-
ance of the new agreements, the judges saw not the traditional,
accommodating values of the small community, but the new,
harsh values of commerce. They saw a market to which, in the
words of a character in Henry Fuller's novel With the Proces-
sion, everyone had "come for the one common, avowed object of
making money. 1 44 The result of that object was that "every
man cultivates his own little bed and his neighbor his; but who
looks after the paths between? They have become a kind of No
Man's Land, and the weeds of a rank iniquity are fast choking
them up.'"145 Many judges held similar views about the conse-
quences of a single-minded search for profit, though they ex-
549, 555, 93 N.W. 459, 461 (1903) (no lack of mutuality "when the discretion, wants, or
needs of a party are referred to an existing" business).
142. Cf. Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263, 278, 174 N.Y.S. 440, 448
(1919) ('In an executory contract, indefinite as to the quantity of goods to be furnished,
there is implied good faith and fair dealing on the part of each toward the other. .. ").
143. B. CARDOZO, The Altruist in Politics, in SELECTED WRrITNGS OF BENJAMIN NA-
THAN CARDozo 47, 47 (M. Hall ed. 1967) (Columbia College Commencement Oration
1889).
144. H. FULLER, supra note 124, at 248.
145. Id.
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pressed them in a different manner; and in a muted way, they
set about policing the "paths between."
Almost without exception, courts that enforced output and
requirements contracts encountered these agreements after a
change in the market presented one party with an opportunity
to make substantial profits. To accept the profit-based morality
of commerce and enforce the open-term contract without limit
did not present the courts with catastrophic choices-it would
neither drive anyone out of business nor reward overbearing
conduct during negotiations. It would, however, deny one party
a share of the bounty newly available to its contractual counter-
part. This imbalance was a cause for concern only to those who
would not accept the morality of profit as the teleology of the
era. Judges expressed that concern with the pejorative observa-
tion that to enforce an open-term contract without limit would
place one party "at the mercy of the other."14
Apprehension that one party was potentially "at the mercy
of the other" made it natural for judges to turn to the analogy of
the fiduciary and of equity when confronted with disputes about
the new contracts. 4 7 A prime example of that reasoning can be
found in Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 48 the first
case in which the highest court of a state held that an obligation
of good faith extended to all contracts.1 4 This decision of the
New York Court of Appeals involved an output contract which
146. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214
(1917); Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N.Y. 642, 645, 29 N.E. 142, 143 (1891). Some courts used
the same language to explain a conclusion that a contract was unenforceable. E.g.,
Schimmel v. Martin, 190 Cal. 429, 432, 213 P. 33, 34 (1923) (contract to supply water;
court concluded that it would be unreasonable to construe contract to promise to supply
water indefinitely at single price in agreement); Campbell v. American Handle Co., 117
Mo. App. 19, 24, 94 S.W. 815, 816 (1906) (party had complete freedom to act for own
profit).
147. Cf. Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 600-01 (1896) ("It
must not be forgotten that in the increasing complexities of modern business relations
equitable remedies have necessarily and steadily been expanded, and no inflexible rule
has been permitted to circumscribe them."); J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2; R. WiEBE, supra
note 1, at 133, 146 (on the adoption of new communal values, the growing impossibility
of distinguishing the individual from the community around him; the recognition of the
fluidity of values).
148. 222 N.Y. 272, 118 N.E. 618 (1915).
149. See id. at 277, 118 N.E. at 619. In this conclusion I disagree with Professor
Burton's conclusion that "the standard doctrinal formulation of the good faith perform-
ance duty was first articulated" in Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y.
79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933). Burton, supra note 11, at 379.
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obligated the buyer to purchase a waste product from a brewery
for five years. The buyer invested a considerable amount of
money in preparing to process the waste product. Then, after
two years, the brewery sold its facility to another company and
attempted to avoid any obligation under the contract by arguing
that it no longer had any output. The court of appeals rejected
the brewery's position with the observation that to accept the
argument would produce an agreement that was too "one-
sided." 150 The court further explained its conclusion with the
general observation that "[e]very contract implies good faith and
fair dealing between the parties to it." '151 The court took its lan-
guage and principle from cases in which one party had complete
control over whether the other party received any benefit at all
from the contract.152 In cases of that sort the courts had rou-
tinely concluded that the party with discretion had to act in
good faith. For example, in Simon v. Etgen, from which the
Wigand court took its language, the court held that, in the ab-
sence of a stated time for performance, a reasonable time would
be implied.153 Similarly, both of the other two precedents cited
by the court in Wigand involved an established legal principle
that one party owed a fiduciary duty to the other. One of those
cases, Industrial & General Trust v. Tod, involved the obliga-
tion of a railroad reorganization committee toward the bond-
holders.15 4 The other case, Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., in-
volved the obligation of an insurance company toward its
insured in settling and litigating a claim. 55 Thus neither the
150. 222 N.Y. at 278, 118 N.E. at 619.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Simon v. Etgen, 213 N.Y. 589, 107 N.E. 1066 (1915); Brassil v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914); Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v.
Tod, 180 N.Y. 215, 73 N.E. 7 (1905).
153. 213 N.Y. at 589, 107 N.E. at 1066. The decision was itself another early in-
stance of a court formulating a broad duty of good faith. The court relied solely upon
Industrial & Gen. Trust and Brassil to support its statement that "[e]very contract im-
plies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it." 213 N.Y. at 595, 107 N.E. at
1067.
154. 180 N.Y. at 225-26, 73 N.E. at 9-10. The court relied upon three precedents,
each involving similar facts, to support its conclusion that the reorganization committee
owed a special duty of good faith to the railroad's bondholders: Shaw v. Railroad Co.,
100 U.S. 605 (1880); Hollister v. Stewart, 111 N.Y. 644, 19 N.E. 782 (1899); White v.
Wood, 129 N.Y. 527, 29 N.E. 835 (1892).
155. 210 N.Y. at 235, 104 N.E. at 622. The court cited no cases to support its state-
ment that "there is a contractual obligation of universal force which underlies all written
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principle nor even the language of the Wigand court was singu-
lar. What was portentous was the application of the principle to
a contract at the heart of mercantile practice. In a society so
dominated by commercial values, it bordered on the heretical for
a court even to imply that any part of the relationship between
buyer and seller in an output contract resembled that of the fi-
duciary. Yet that is precisely what the New York courts did at
the time of Wigand and Wood.
In two other roughly contemporaneous decisions, lower New
York courts reached similar conclusions. Each case involved
buyers under requirements contracts who wanted to order sub-
stantial quantities of goods after the market price increased.
The first of the two cases, Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mendleson,58
concerned a contract made in 1914 to supply caustic soda for the
year 1915. The buyer placed no orders until the end of Novem-
ber 1915. By that time the market price for the soda had more
than doubled. Even though the contract fixed the maximum
amount of soda that could be ordered, the court held that the
buyer could order only what it needed in its regular business.
The court directly linked the notion of good faith with opposi-
tion to conduct with the sole object of making money:
[A]s to an executory contract which is indefinite as to the
quantity of goods to be furnished, the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing toward each other is implied, and a party to a
contract has no right to use it for a purpose not within the
contemplation of the parties, as for speculative, as distin-
guished from regular and ordinary business, purposes.151
agreements. It is the obligation of good faith in carrying out what is written." Id. at 241,
104 N.E. at 624.
156. 180 A.D. 9, 167 N.Y.S. 435 (1917).
157. Id. at 12, 167 N.Y.S. at 437. To support that conclusion the court relied upon
an earlier decision of the court of appeals, New York Cent. Iron Works Co. v. United
States Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903). In Iron Works the court allowed a
buyer to order more than twice the amount of pipe required by the buyer in the previous
year. Foreshadowing the emergence of a general obligation of good faith, the court ex-
plained that there were limits "in such a contract." Id. at 335, 66 N.E. at 968. "The
obligation of good faith and fair dealing towards each other is implied in every contract
of this character. The [buyer] could not use the contract for the purpose of speculation
in a rising market since that would be a plain abuse of the rights conferred, and some-
thing like a fraud upon the seller." Id. The only other case cited was an early stage of
Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263, 174 N.Y.S. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1919). See
infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
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The second of the two cases, Moore v. American Molasses
Co., 5" involved a dispute over a contract to supply Moore's "full
requirements" of molasses for a year. As the market price ap-
proached twice the contract price and Moore ordered fifteen
percent more than in any previous year, the company refused to
meet further orders. The company especially objected to
Moore's use of postcards advertising molasses for sale at below
the prevailing market price. The court, like the other New York
courts, castigated the buyer for such purely pecuniary
motives.8 9
That castigation represented the final step toward imposing
a general duty of good faith on contracting parties. The judicial
reaction was comparable to siding with Dorothy in her confron-
tation with the Wizard of Oz. The judges offered protection
solely because the parties were perceived as being weak, without
requiring that the parties pay for the protection. e0 The courts
had come to realize that the essence of the new contractual prac-
tices was sharing. As the nineteenth century struggled to a close,
the courts had recognized that mercantile agreements could be
no more certain than the uncertain economy itself. The typical
relationship between the contracting parties was no longer a dis-
crete transaction based on a particular performance, promised
for an assured future. Instead, the parties left open a term in the
agreement, binding themselves to move together into the uncer-
tain future.' 6 ' In recognition of that relationship, the courts had
158. 106 Misc. at 263, 174 N.Y.S. at 440.
159. Id. at 278, 174 N.Y.S. at 448 (citing Asahal Wheeler Co. v. Mendleson, 180 A.D.
at 9, 167 N.Y.S. at 435).
160. Cf. Hilleary v. Skookum Root Hair Grower Co., 4 Misc. 127, 131, 23 N.Y.S.
1016, 1018 (N.Y.C.C.P. Ct. 1893) (good faith required when uncertainty and doubt might
place one party at the mercy of the other).
161. More recently, Professor Ian Macneil has been a prime proponent of the theory
that many contracts are "relational"-they involve more than single, discrete encounters
between the parties. See, e.g., I. MACNEIL, supra note 2; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment
of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Con-
tract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854 (1978); Macneil, A Primer of Contract Planning, 48 S.
CAL. L. REv. 627 (1975); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691
(1974). In a similar vein, Professor Speidel has written of the obligations arising from
long-term contracts:
In short, the long-term supply contract is a bit more complex than the "one-
shot" sale of Dobbin or Blackacre. Beyond its obvious economic importance, it
complicates, and perhaps prevents, complete risk planning at the time of con-
tracting. Complete consent is a mirage. Over time, "gaps" in the initial agree-
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taken a first step toward enforcing the contracts by reasoning
that sellers in output contracts could not sell to anyone else, and
buyers in requirements contracts could not buy from anyone
else.
This new reasoning did more than respond to the formal re-
quirements for mutuality by providing one party with an obliga-
tion which could match the obligation of the other party."6 2
Binding the fates of the parties so firmly together made it easier
for the courts to determine whether there would be limits to the
obligation. The close ties between the parties prompted the real-
ization that the relationship between them was akin to one of
sharing. Thereafter, courts were able to view parties to the new
contracts as being more like partners or co-adventurers than like
atomistic elements of a larger economy. The courts were then
able to invoke, in the language of both Woods and Wells, the
proscription that no agreement would be allowed to place one
party "at the mercy of the other." The phrase referred only to
what was perceived as an unseemly rush for profits. Those who
sought only profits were branded with the same disparaging la-
bel as those who dealt in grain futures. They all were "specula-
tors," immoral because they sought profit without production.163
One who attempted to speculate was said to have not acted in
ment will undoubtedly emerge. At the same time, specialized uses of the con-
tract will increase both the cost of terminating the relationship and the
likelihood that the market will be unable to provide an adequate substitute for
either party.
Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76
Nw. U. L. REV. 369, 375 (1981); see also Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales
Contracts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. REv. 241 (1980). For a
study of how businessmen actually work out their disputes see Macaulay, Non-Contrac-
tual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 An. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). Both Pro-
fessor Macauly and Professor Macneil contributed to a symposium published by the
Wisconsin Law Review. See Macauly, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
465; Macneil, Relational Contracts: What We Do and Do Not Know, id. at 483.
162. See eog.., National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427, 433-34
(1884); Semon Bache & Co. v. Coppes, Zook & Mutschler Co., 35 Ind. App. 351, 355-56,
74 N.E. 41, 42-43 (1905); Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 83 Minn. 346, 350, 86 N.W.
344, 346 (1901); Cincinnati, S. & C. R.R. v. Consolidated Coal & Mining Co., 8 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 365, 367-82 (Cincinnati Super Ct. 1882), rev'd, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 15 (Hamil-
ton Dist. Ct. 1883), aff'd, id. at 15 n. t (1887).
163. For a case in which the court distinguished a requirements contract from the
speculation involved in a grain deal, see Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co.,
160 Ill. 85, 43 N.E. 774 (1895).
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good faith and therefore could not enforce the contract."6 4 The
moral opprobrium attached to a pure seeker of profit (who pro-
duced nothing) manifested itself in holdings that restricted re-
quirements to actual needs for business. 165 The effect of that
limitation was that neither party would be allowed to reap sub-
stantial profits without sharing them with the other party.
By so restricting parties to open-term contracts, the courts
effected a compromise between traditional and modern values.
The courts allowed commercial practice to develop according to
the needs of the market; but they insisted that the development
be mediated by values other than those of commerce. In the end,
then, both society and its law adapted to uncertainty by turning
to embrace it. Sarah Orne Jewett's well-read sea captain was
correct in his observation: "Certainty, not conjecture is what we
all desire[d]." But, as he noted, the desire had long been unful-
164. See, e.g., Laclede Constr. Co. v. T.J. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25, 84 S.W. 76
(1904); New York Cent. Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66
N.E. 967 (1903); Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mendleson, 180 A.D. 9, 167 N.Y.S. 435 (1917);
Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263, 174 N.Y.S. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1919). For
similar reasoning about the conduct of the seller in an output contract, see Loudenback
Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298, 303 (6th Cir. 1903).
165. See, e.g., Manhattan Oil Co. v. Richardson Lubricating Co., 113 F. 923, 925 (2d
Cir. 1902); American Trading Co. v. National Fibre & Insulation Co., 31 Del. 65, 84-85,
111 A. 290, 298 (Super. Ct. 1920); Scott v. T.W. Stevenson Co., 130 Minn. 151, 153 N.W.
316 (1915). For a discussion of the diverse conclusions reached by the courts, see Havig-
hurst & Berman, supra note 75. The moral sense also revealed itself in the many cases
dealing with jobbers, who had no established business but served only as middlemen,
able to increase or decrease their requirements according to the market. See, e.g., Crane
v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1901) (contract with retail merchant lacks
mutuality); Higbie v. Rust, 211 Ill. 333, 337, 71 N.E. 1010, 1011 (1904) (contract lacks
mutuality); Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Dykes, 210 Mo. App. 399, 405, 238 S.W. 556, 557
(1922) (contract with door-to-door salesman lacks mutuality); Jackson v. Alpha Portland
Cement Co., 122 A.D. 345, 348-49, 106 N.Y.S. 1052, 1054-55 (1907) (contract with retail
dealer lacks mutuality). But see T.W. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 F. 278
(S.D. Cal. 1916), rev'd, 247 F. 958 (9th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 659 (1922) (dis-
trict court held agreement lacking in mutuality because buyer was a wholesale dealer
who could alter requirements; court of appeals reversed, holding that there was a pre-
sumption of integrity of conduct); Fontaine v. Baxley, Boles & Co., 90 Ga. 416, 426, 17
S.E. 1015, 1018 (1892) (contract in which manufacturer agreed to supply all railroad ties
that middleman might sell enforced because of past performance and middleman's reli-
ance); Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 189 A.D. 843, 847-48, 179
N.Y.S. 271, 273 (1919), rev'd, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921). Not all decisions were
alike. When a requirements contract stated both minimum and maximum quantities, one
court permitted the buyer to order both for resale and for its own needs, so long as the
orders were within the limits set by the contract. Aetna Explosives Co. v. Diamond Al-
kali Co., 277 Pa. 392, 121 A. 201 (1923).
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filled because people had "not looked for truth in the right
direction."'1 6
166. S. JEwmr, supra note 46, at 23; cf. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 609, at
689 (1960) ("[C]ertainty in the law is largely an illusion at best, and altogether too high a
price may be paid in the effort to attain it."); F. KERMODE, supra note 47, at 97 ("The
very locus of human uncertainty, henceforth to be thought of not as an imperfection of
the human apparatus but part of the nature of things, a condition of what we may
know."); Bradbury & McFarlane, supra note 1, at 48 (characteristic of modernism is "to
see ... uncertainty as the only certain thing"); Gilmore, supra note 3, at 442 ("change is
our only constant"); Peters, Grant Gilmore and the Illusion of Certainty, 92 YALE L.J. 8
(1982).
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